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The mind-body problem has two essential aspects  the problem of mental causation and 
the problem of consciousness.  Substance or property dualism is able to address the latter 
but not the former aspect adequately.  Reductive physicalism is able to address the former 
but not the latter aspect adequately.  Non-reductive physicalism, which aims to address 
both aspects of the mind-body problem adequately, has established itself as the orthodox 
position.  However, Jaegwon Kim asserts that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently 
unstable position in holding both the mutually incompatible non-reductivism thesis and 
physicalism thesis.  This argument introduces a dilemma in non-reductive physicalism, 
which leads to its inevitable collapse into dualism, epiphenomenalism or reductive 
physicalism.  To avoid this collapse, I propose a version of non-reductive physicalism 
based on the contentious notions of constitution and emergence.  In my view, constitution 
is neither the identity of parts and wholes nor the co-location of two distinct objects.  And 
emergence is neither a strong ontological thesis which affirms downward causation nor a 
weak epistemological thesis which denies relational properties.  Rather, constitution and 
emergence are non-reductive, part-whole notions with emphasis on the configuration of 
parts and relational properties of wholes.  I argue that this view, which I call constitutive 
emergence, is able to hold on to both the non-reductivism and physicalism theses without 









The Mind-Body Problem (MBP) has two essential aspects.  Substance or property 
dualism, in holding that mind and body are separate and distinct substances or properties, 
faces a problem of explaining how the non-physical substance or properties of the mind 
interact with the physical substance or property of the body and vice versa.1  In other 
words, dualism cannot adequately explain how the non-physical mental states can have 
causal power over physical states and vice versa.  This first aspect of the MBP is known 
as the problem of mental causation.  Reductive physicalism, in holding that mind is 
nothing over and above the brain, or that mental states are nothing over and above brain 
states, faces a problem of explaining how our inherently private mental processes are 
nothing over and above our publicly observable brain processes.  In other words, 
reductive physicalism cannot adequately explain the qualitative differences between the 
mind and the brain, or between mental states and brain states.  This second aspect of 
MBP is known as the problem of consciousness.2  Put simply, dualism provides a 
solution to the problem of consciousness but faces the problem of mental causation; 
                                                
1In this paper, substance dualism refers only to Descartes interactionism between minds and bodies, which 
faces the problem of mental causation.  It does not refer to Spinozas and Leibnizs parallelism, where there 
are no interactions between minds and bodies.  Note that though parallelism does not face the problem of 
mental causation, it does collapse into some form of epiphenomenalism discussed later. 
2 Throughout this paper, I take consciousness to mean broadly the subjective nature of our experiences or 
our first-person perspective.  The problem of consciousness, then, refers to the inadequacy of reductionist 
theories of mind in accounting for the subjective nature of our experiences or our first-person perspective. 
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reductive physicalism avoids the problem of mental causation but faces the problem of 
consciousness. 
 
In this study, I seek a solution to MBP that attempts to solve both the problem of 
consciousness and the problem of mental causation simultaneously.  And I have to state 
up front that my task here is to derive a conceptual solution to a conceptual problem, and 
not an empirical solution to an empirical question.  For my research objective, I do not 
attempt to answer the question How does the biological brain give rise to conscious 
states? nor do I aim to survey the latest cognitive or neurological findings to shed light 
on this question.  Instead, I would like to provide an answer to the question How to 
conceive the mind in relation to the body? by drawing from the relevant insights of 
various philosophers to that effect. While focused on answering the conceptual question 
How to conceive the mind in relation to the body? I do not deny that the empirical 
question How does the biological brain give rise to conscious states? forms an 
important part of MBP.  But the former question can be answered by building on a string 
of related concepts formulated by some philosophers while the latter requires further 
empirical studies.  Moreover, I believe that I can work towards an adequate answer to the 
former question without touching much on the latter. 
 
An adequate solution to the MBP requires us to solve both the problems of mental 
causation and consciousness simultaneously.  Two principles serve to guide us in 
deriving an adequate solution.  The first principle, Ockhams razor, requires us not to 
assume plurality without necessity.  In the context of MBP, it can mean that we need not 
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postulate non-physical substances or properties unnecessarily to explain the phenomenon 
of conscious experiences.  The second principle, saving appearances, requires us to 
account for how things seem like to us.  In the context of MBP, it can mean that we need 
to account for the subjective nature of our mental states and not to simply explain it 
away.  In the light of these two principles, it would seem that an adequate solution to 
MBP lies in the middle road between dualism and reductive physicalism, that is, towards 
some form of non-reductive physicalism (NRP).  To understand what NRP entails, we 





Jaegwon Kim, in his article The Mind-Body Problem at Centurys Turn, provides us 
with a useful working definition of physicalism as follows: 
 
The core of contemporary physicalism is the thesis that all things that exist in the world 
are bits of matter and structures aggregated out of bits of matter, all behaving in 
accordance with the laws of physics.  This metaphysical thesis has a companion 
epistemological thesis, the claim that all phenomena of the world can be physically 
explained if they can be explained at all. (Kim 2004, P.129) 
 
If the physicalism thesis is true, then the problem of mental causation arises.  For how do 
minds fit into a world where only matter and aggregates of matter are all that exist?  In 
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his Mental Causation and Consciousness: The Two Mind-Body Problems for the 
Physicalist, Kim makes explicit the causal implications of the physicalism thesis, which 
can be expressed in two principles.  The first he calls the principle of the Causal Closure 
of the Physical Domain: 
 
Principle Causal Closure of the Physical Domain: If a physical event has a cause at t, 
then it has a physical cause at t. 
 
Note that this principle only states that all physical events have physical causes.  It does 
not rule out non-physical events that may have non-physical causes.  To rule out non-
physical causes, we require the second principle of Causal Exclusion: 
 
Principle of Causal Exclusion: If an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, then no event at t 
distinct from c can be the cause of e (unless this is a genuine case of causal over-
determination). 
 
Combined with the first principle, the second principle implies the following Principle of 
the Causal Exclusion of the Physical Domain: 
 
Principle of the Causal Exclusion of the Physical Domain: If a physical event e has a 




This principle rules out non-physical causes of physical events.  And if non-physical 




In the context of MBP, reductionism is the idea that mental events are reducible to 
(metaphysical reduction) or reductively explainable in terms of (epistemological 
reduction) physical events.  Three forms of reductionism are consistent with the 
principles of causal closure and causal exclusion of the physical domain.  The first is 
known as the mind-brain identity theory, where the mind is (nothing over and above) the 
brain or where mental states are (nothing over and above) brain states.  Here, minds and 
mental states do not have causal powers on their own and their causal powers are 
identical to those of the brain and brain states.  The second and more extreme form of 
reductionism is known as eliminative physicalism, which denies that minds and mental 
states exist.  Here, only brains and brain states exist; minds and mental states are only 
fictitious constructions.  The third is known as epiphenomenal dualism that affirms the 
existence of minds and mental states but denies that they have any causal powers.  Here, 
causally impotent mental states simply tag along with the causally potent brain states.  
Some philosophers would find all these forms of reductionism inadequate in addressing 
the problem of consciousness and argues for mental realism, the view that minds and 
mental states are real and causally relevant.  As the problem of mental causation has 
rendered dualism an implausible position, most of these thinkers would want to keep both 





Kim discussed three forms of NRPs and shows how all of them eventually collapse into 
physical reductionism.  The first form is Donald Davidsons Anomalous Monism, which 
can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Mental events enter into causal relations with physical events. 
2. Causal relations must be backed by laws (or must exhibit lawful regularities). 
3. There are no psychological or psychophysical laws. 
4. Hence, any causal relation involving a mental event must instantiate a physical 
law; or any causal relation involving a mental event has a physical description and 
falls under a physical event. 
5. And hence, a mental event is also a physical event; or a mental property is also a 
physical property 
 
According to Anomalous Monism, events are causes or effects only if they instantiate 
physical laws or an events mental properties can only figure in causal relations only 
when they are also physical properties.  This implies that only physical events or 
properties can figure as causes or effects, and that mental events or properties are 
causally or explanatorily impotent.  Hence, Anomalous Monism has collapsed into a form 
of reductionism  namely epiphenomenal dualism. 
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The second form is the Supervenience Argument.  Donald Davidson, in his article 
Mental Events, describes the notion of supervenience as follows: 
 
Although the position I describe denies that there are psychophysical laws, it is 
consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or 
supervenient, on physical characteristics.  Such supervenience might be taken to mean 
that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental 
respects, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some 
physical respect.  Dependence or supervenience of this kind does not entail reducibility 
through law or definition: if it did, we could reduce moral properties to descriptive, and 
this there is good reason to believe cannot be done. (Davidson 1980, P.214) 
 
Kim observed that this notion of supervenience has two requirements.  First, the relation 
between mental (supervenient property) and physical (subvenient property) 
characteristics is non-reductive.  Second, the relation is one of dependence.  That is, 
mental (supervenient property) is dependent on or determined by physical (subvenient 
property) characteristics.  And Kim identified a problem with the supervenience relation.  
If the relation is weak enough to be non-reductive, it tends to be too weak to serve as a 
dependence relation.  For it is compatible with co-relating but independent mental and 
physical characteristics held by dualism.  If the relation is strong enough to support 
dependence, then it is strong enough to imply reductionism.  For if mental characteristics 
are completely dependent on or determined by physical characteristics, then the mental 
characteristics have no causal powers on their own.  The dilemma faced by the 
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supervenience relation is this: either it is too weak and collapses into dualism or it is too 
strong and collapses into reductive physicalism. 
 
The third form is the Multiple Realisation Argument, which can be formulated as 
follows: for any mental state, there is an indefinite number of nomologically possible 
physical states such that, though each of physical states realises or implements the mental 
state, none of them are co-extensive with it.   Hence, a mental state cannot be reducible to 
the disjunctive physical realisers.  Kim concedes that although a global or general 
reduction of mental states to their physical realisers (also known as the type identity 
theory) is impossible, a local or specific reduction is still possible.  For example, we 
cannot reduce a mental state m1 to p1 for all cases but we can reduce mental state m1 to 
p1 in organism 1, p2 in organism 2, and p3 in organism etc.  And so m1 can be co-
extensive with p1 in organism 1, and p2 in organism 2 etc. In this way, the causal power 
of m1 can be reducible to p1 in organism 1 etc. Hence, the Multiple Realisation 
Argument has collapsed into a form of reductionism  namely the token identity theory. 
 
According to Kim, NRP generally affirms the following theses: 
 
1. Mental properties are not reducible to physical properties.  (Irreducibility) 
2. Mental properties are causal properties.  (Mental Realism) 
3. Mental events cause physical events.  (Downward Causation) 
4. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t. (Causal 
Closure of the Physical Domain) 
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Thesis (1) rejects all forms of mind-brain identity theory.  Theses (2) and (3) reject 
epiphenomenal dualism.  Note that thesis (4) is compatible with theses (1) to (3).  More 
importantly, although it states that physical events must have physical causes, it does not 
deny that physical events can have mental causes as well.  Hence, thesis (4) leaves room 
for theses (1) to (3).   
 
Kim argues that NRP is unstable.  Suppose that a certain event c causes a physical event e 
in virtue of its mental property.  Thesis (4) requires that a physical event must also have a 
physical cause.  So we may assume that event c causes event e in virtue of its physical 
property as well.  The following question now arises: what is the relationship between 
these two causes, one mental and the other physical?  Kim discussed two possibilities: 
first, we can say that each is only a partial and necessary cause, and the two together 
make the complete and sufficient cause.  This violates thesis (4) by saying that part of 
event c goes outside the physical domain.  Second, we can say that each is an 
independent and sufficient cause, and this means event e is over-determined.  This 
violates thesis (4) too by saying that if the physical cause had not occurred, the mental 
cause would have caused the effect by itself.  Hence, a more plausible answer is required 
for the question: how are the mental cause and the physical cause of the single effect 
related to each other? 
 
One plausible option is to identify the mental cause with the physical cause, so that there 
is only one cause and not two.  The identification of mental properties with physical 
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properties is the central tenet of the mind-brain identity theory.  Here, theses (1), (2) and 
(3) are rejected.  And if NRP accepts this, it collapses into a form of reductive 
physicalism.  Another plausible option is to say that there is only one physical cause that 
can be described in two different ways  mentally and physically.  This position is known 
as conceptual dualism which accepts ontological reduction but rejects epistemological 
reduction of the mental to the physical.  Here, theses (2) and (3) are rejected.  And if NRP 
accepts this, it collapses into a form of epiphenomenal dualism.  Hence, as Kim noted, 
NRP is an unstable position.  Are there any other answers NRP can offer to the question: 
what is the relationship between the mental cause and the physical cause of a single 
effect?  Or put another way: how are the mental cause and the physical cause of a single 
effect related to each other? 
 
Constitutive Emergence as Non-Reductive Physicalism 
 
In what follows, I would like to explore the notions of constitution and emergence as a 
form of NRP.  Constitution is best conceived of as a mereological or part-whole relation.  
Some philosophers believe that constitution is an identity relation.  This is the view that 
the whole is not greater than the sum of its parts, or that the whole is identical with the 
sum of its parts.  In the context of MBP, it implies that if the brain constitutes the mind, 
then the brain is identical with the mind.  This view is not able to account for qualitative 
differences between the whole and the sum of its parts.  Or in the context of MBP, it is 
not able to account for the qualitative differences between the brain and the mind.  Other 
philosophers believe that constitution is not an identity relation and that the whole is 
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more than the sum of its parts.  In the context of MBP, it implies that if the brain 
constitutes the mind, then the brain is not identical with the mind.  This view is not able 
to account for there being two distinct things in the same place at the same time.  Or in 
the context of MBP, it is not able to account for there being separate and distinct brain 
and mind, existing in the same place at the same time.  In chapter two, I would discuss 
the notion of constitution in greater detail, argue for the view that that constitution is a 
mereological relation without identity, and examine its implications for MBP. 
 
Emergence is the idea that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.  When objects 
reach a certain level of organisational complexity, new properties emerges at the level of 
wholes that are not possessed by its parts.  These new properties possessed by the whole 
have causal powers over the properties possessed by its parts.  In the context of MBP, it 
implies that the mind emerges from the organisational complexity of the brain and that 
the emergent mental properties have causal powers over basal physical properties.  This 
is the stronger view of emergence that postulates configurational forces and affirms 
downward causation.  More generally, it accepts theses (1) to (3).  There is a weaker view 
of emergence that does not postulate configurational forces and denies downward 
causation.  More generally, it accepts theses (1) and (2) but not (3).  I agree with the latter 
view that it is possible to affirm emergence without accepting configurational forces and 
downward causation.  In chapter three, I would discuss the notion of emergence in greater 
detail, argue for the view that emergent properties are simply the ways objects are, and 
examine its implications for MBP.  It is important to note that the notions of constitution 
and emergence, when they are construed in certain ways, are compatible with one 
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another.  In fact, they are actually the converse of one another.  While constitution takes 
the bottom-up (parts to whole) approach, emergence takes the top-down (whole to parts) 
approach. 
 
In this study, I aim to show that NRP in the form of constitutive emergence presents one 
of the most promising options compared to those discussed above in resolving the MBP.  
It wields the Ockhams Razor  the first guiding principle  by not postulating non-
physical substances and properties to solve the problem of consciousness.  And it 
attempts to save appearances  the second guiding principle  by not reducing mental 
states to merely brain states to solve the problem of mental causation.  As noted by Kim, 
the central challenge faced by NRP is its inherent instability.  In affirming both non-
reductivism (theses 1 to 3) and physicalism (thesis 4), NRP risks collapsing into either 
dualism or reductive physicalism.  It is my aim to show that NRP, construed as 
constitutive emergence, is resilient against either collapse.  In the concluding chapter, I 
would summarise the constitutive emergence approach to the MBP by integrating both 
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Constitution is a key conceptual component of non-reductive physicalism.  It is the idea 
that the whole is made up of its parts.  I would first examine the problem of material 
constitution and some of the solutions proposed by various philosophers.  The solutions 
are divided into mainly two different camps  one advocating the identity between the 
whole and its constituting parts and another advocating the distinction between the whole 
and its constitution parts.  This is followed by a discussion of the various versions of 
identity thesis and their difficulties.  Next, I would present Lynn Rudder Bakers thesis of 
constitution, which I have some sympathy for and highlight a few difficulties.  Then, I 
will argue for a modified constitution thesis and conclude this chapter by examining how 
this modified constitution thesis can help shed light on the mind-body problem. 
 
The Problem of Material Constitution 
 
The problem of material constitution arises from analysing relationship between parts and 
wholes.  In particular, it is the problematic relationship between a material object and the 
material parts that constitute it.  The Constitution is Identity view holds that the material 
object is identical to the material parts that constitute it.  According to this view, it is not 
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possible for two objects to exist in the same place at the same time and hence the material 
object and its constituting parts must be identical.  The Constitution is Not Identity view 
holds that the material object is distinct from the material parts that constitute it.  
According to this view, the material object and its constituting parts cannot be identical 
because there could be at least one property they do not share and this implies that it is 
possible for two objects (the material object and the material parts) to exist in the same 
place at the same time.  The defenders of the Constitution is Identity view need to show 
that the differences between the material object and its constituting parts are merely 
apparent.  And the notions of strict identity, contingent identity, relative identity, 
Abelardian predicates will be discussed to evaluate their success in doing so.  The 
defenders of the Constitution is Not Identity need to show that their view does not 
necessarily imply two entities existing in the same place at the same time although there 
are some who accepts this consequence.  And the notion of accidental sameness and 
Lynn Rudder Bakers notion of constitution will be used to represent this view and its 
success is assessed accordingly. 
 
Constitution is Identity Theses 
 
Constitution as Strict Identity 
 
In his paper Composition as Identity, Peter van Inwagen describes mereology as a 
theory about composition  the relationship of parts and wholes, and goes on to discuss 
the view of David Lewis presented in Parts of Classes.  Lewis central claim is that 
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Mereology is ontologically innocent.  That is, in accepting fusions, mereology requires us 
to accept only what is identical with what we have already accepted.  And Mereology 
asks us to accept nothing more than the fusions of what we already accept.  This point 
can be expressed as either y is a fusion of xs or y is composed of xs.  When we accept 
y, we are only accepting the totality of xs that compose y and nothing else.  In other 
words, Composition is a kind of identity.  The following quote is a summary of Lewis 
(unqualified) view: 
 
I say that composition  the relation of part to whole, or, better, the many-one relation 
of the many parts and their fusion  is like identity.  The are of composition is, so to 
speak, the plural form of the is of identity.  Call this the thesis of Composition as 
Identity.  It is virtue of this thesis that mereology is ontologically innocent; it commits us 
only to things that are identical, so to speak, to what we were committed to before. 
(Lewis 1991, P.82) 
 
Lewiss view can be made clearer by examining various other quotes from his Parts of 
Classes: 
 
1. The fusion of the xs just is the xs. (Lewis 1991, P.81) 
2. The xs are the fusion of the xs. (Lewis 1991, P.81) 
 
I read statements (1) and (2) as saying that the whole is nothing more than its aggregate 
parts.  The is and are refer to identity relations. 
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3. Commit yourself to the existence of the xs all together or one at a time, its the 
same commitment either way. (Lewis 1991, P.81) 
4. The whole is the many parts counted as one thing. (Lewis 1991, P.83) 
 
I read statements (3) and (4) as saying that the whole and its aggregate parts are to be 
counted as a single entity.  They are one and the same thing. 
 
5. Take the xs together or take them separately, the xs are the same portion of 
Reality either way. (Lewis 1991, P.81) 
6. If you draw up an inventory of Realityit would be double counting to list the 
fusion of the xs and also list the xs. (Lewis 1991, P.81) 
 
I read statements (5) and (6) as saying that the aggregate of parts are all that exists and 
the whole does not has a separate and distinct existence from the aggregate of its parts. 
 
From these statements, Lewis argues that mereology is ontologically innocent because 
the whole is nothing more than, just the summation of, not separate and distinct from 
its aggregate parts.  The whole is equivalent without residue to the composition of its 
parts.  Again in short, composition is identity. 
 
Van Inwagen observed that Lewis eventually qualified his identity claim. 
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even though the many and the one are the same portion of Reality, and the character 
of the portion is given once and for all whether we take it as many or take it as one, still 
we do not really have a generalised principle of indiscernibility of identicals.  It does 
matter how you slice it  not to the character of whats described, of course, but to the 
form of the description.  Whats true of the many is not exactly true of the one.  After all, 
there are many while it is one. (Lewis 1991, P.87) 
 
In this passage, Lewis seems to admit that strict identity (as expressed by the principle of 
indiscernibility of identicals) between the whole and its aggregate parts may not be true, 
as whats true of the many is not exactly true of the one.  Nonetheless, in saying that 
there are many while it is one, he seems to insist that the whole and its aggregate parts 
are still identical in some sense.  Lewis elaborates: 
 
Mereological relationsare strikingly analogous to ordinary identity.  So striking is 
this analogy that it is appropriate to mark it by speaking of mereological relations  the 
many -one relation of composition, the one-one relations of part to whole and overlap  
as kinds of identity.  Ordinary identity is the special limiting case of identity in the 
broadened sense.  (Lewis 1991, P.83) 
 
As remarked by Van Inwagen, this passage seems to say that our vocabulary does not 
reflect the striking analogy between composition and identity and it is hence appropriate 
to expand the meaning of identity to cover both composition and identity.  In Parts of 
Classes (P.85), Lewis tells us that the analogy has many aspects: 
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a. Just as it is redundant to say that x and y exist when x is identical to y, so it is 
redundant to say that x and the ys exist, when x is a fusion of the ys. 
b. Just as given that x exists, it is automatically true that something identical with x 
exists, so given that the xs exists, it is automatically true that a fusion of the xs 
exists. 
c. Just as there cannot be two things both of which are identical with x, so there 
cannot be two things both of which are fusions of xs. 
d. Just as to fully describe the x is to fully describe the object that is identical with 
x, so to fully describe xs is fully to describe their fusion. 
e. Just as x and y must occupy the same region of space-time if the former is 
identical with the latter, so x and the ys must occupy the same region of space-
time if the former is the fusion of the latter. 
 
The following quote Van Inwagens summary of Lewis (qualified) view: 
 
Since composition and identity are analogous in these five respects, it is philosophically 
appropriate to expand the meaning of identity to cover both composition and identity, 
and to regard what used to be called identity as the special limiting case of what is 
now called identity.  (Van Inwagen 1994, P.217) 
 
Van Inwagen commented that the analogy between composition and identity is so weak 
as really not to be much of an analogy at all.  One may still insist that if the whole and its 
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aggregate parts are indeed identical, then they should not be discernible.  If mereology is 
a correct theory of composition, Lewiss composition as identity thesis would appear to 
be correct  and otherwise not.  And if the composition as identity thesis is correct, then 
mereology is ontologically innocent.  As I will make clear later on, one reason why the 
problem of material constitution arises is because of the failure to distinguish between 
material parts and ways the material parts are.  If x and the fusions of xs are identical, I 
assume that they are strictly the same object which must have all properties in common, 
as required by Leibnizs criterion of identity.  However, as we will see below, it is 
possible for xs and the fusion of xs to be qualitatively different.  If this is true, then 
mereology may not be ontologically innocent as Lewis claims it to be. 
 
Constitution as Contingent Identity 
 
Allan Gibbard, in his article Contingent Identity, developed the popular Lumpl/Goliath 
story to discuss the problem of material constitution.  A sculptor sets out to construct the 
statue of Goliath in the following way: he sculpts Goliaths upper body from one piece of 
clay and lower body from another, and then joins the two pieces of clay together to form 
one new piece of clay which is Goliath.  This new piece of play is allowed to harden and 
he smashes it the next day (perhaps because the sculpture is not good enough), thereby 
destroying both the new piece of clay and Goliath. 
 
The first question here is whether the piece of clay (Lumpl) is identical with the statue 
Goliath.  Gibbard says yes.  Lumpl and Goliath come into existence at the same time 
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when the two difference pieces of clay (upper and lower body of the statue) come 
together, they are constituted by the same clay parts, and they occupy the same space at 
the same time before their destruction.  The second question here whether the piece of 
clay (Lumpl) is necessarily identical with the statue Goliath.  Gibbard says no because it 
is possible that Lumpl continue to exist while Goliath does not, or that Goliath continue 
to exist while Lumpl does not.  In the former case, one can imagine the sculptor moulding 
Lumpl (the same piece of clay) to another statue Hercules.  In the latter case, one can 
imagine the sculptor re-sculpting Goliath with a piece of bronze instead.  Hence, Gibbard 
says that Lumpl and Goliath are only contingently but not necessarily identical.  In her 
article Why Constitution is not Identity?, Lynn Rudder Baker advanced two criticisms 
against Gibbards view  The first is metaphysical and the second epistemological. 
 
Metaphysically, the constitution as contingent identity view affords no unified account of 
the relation between persons and bodies or between Lumpl and Goliath.  This view holds 
that x and y are contingently identical only if x and y share all their categorical 
properties, where categorical properties are those that do not depend on how things are in 
other worlds.   For example, if x and y are contingently identical, then both x and y start 
to exist at the same time and cease to exist at the same time.  Gibbard suggests that a 
person cease to exist when the body dies.  If a persons body continues to exist (perhaps 
buried) after death, then the person is not contingently identical with the body.  And if the 
body is destroyed (perhaps cremated) after death, then the person is contingently identical 
with the body.  On this view then, whether or nor a person is contingently identical with 
the body depends on the fate of the body at death, affirmative when the body continues to 
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exist at death and negative when the body is destroyed at death.  Hence, the constitution 
as contingent identity view affords no unified account of the relation between person and 
bodies, between Lumpl and Goliath, or between any other things related by constitution.  
According to Baker, the constitution without identity view can offer a unified account of 
such relations. 
 
Epistemologically, we would not be justified to know whether x and y are contingently 
identical while they exist if the constitution as contingent identity view is correct.  This is 
because in order identity of x and y to be contingent, it must be possible that they have 
different properties; but in order for x and y to be identical at all, they must actually have 
all their properties in common, including ceasing to exist at the same.  Before the demise 
of x and y however, we are not justified to know whether they will differ or be identical 
in the future.  According to Baker, this problem will not arise on the constitution without 
identity view, where if x constitutes y now, we can be justified in asserting now that x 
constitutes y.  On the constitution as contingent identity view, where if x is contingently 
identical to y now, we cannot be justified in asserting now that x is contingently identical 
to y.  Bakers constitution without identity view will be discussed in greater detail later. 
 
Constitution as Relative Identity 
 
In his article Constitution is Not Identity, Mark Johnston discussed two ways of stating 
constitution is identity.  The two ways are: 
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a. If y is a paradigm F and x is intrinsically exactly like y then x is an F. 
 
Applying this statement to the statue example: if Goliath is a paradigm statue and Lumpl 
is intrinsically exactly like Goliath, then Lumpl is a statue. 
 
b. If y is a paradigm F and x is an entity that differs from y in any respect relevant to 
being an F only minutely, then x is an F. 
 
Applying this statement to the statue example: if Goliath is a paradigm statue and Lumpl 
is an entity that differs from Goliath in any respect relevant to being a paradigm statue 
only minutely, then Lumpl is a statue.  Johnston argues that (a) could be true but (b) is 
false, and that the acceptance of (a) requires the acceptance of (b).  And since (b) is false, 
(a) could not be true.  I would not want to elaborate on Johnstons argument but instead 
comment on the success and relevance of these two statements in resolving the problem 
of material constitution. 
 
In her article Why Constitution is not Identity Lynn Rudder Baker says that it is false to 
say that if y is an F in virtue of its relational properties, and x is intrinsically like y, then x 
is an F.  Bakers argument against relative identity can be formulated as follows: 
 
Let F = having a specific artistic value. 
Let y = Goliath 
Let x = Lumpl (a piece of clay) 
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a. To be relatively identical (or intrinsically exactly alike), both x and y must be F. 
b. Goliath (y) has the relational property of having a certain artistic value (F).  That 
is, y is F. 
c. Lumpl (x) does not have the relational property of having a certain artistic value 
(F).  That is, x is not F. 
d. Therefore, Lumpl (x) is not relatively identical to (or not intrinsically exactly like) 
Goliath (y).  That is, x ≠ y. 
 
The argument for relative identity aims to establish x = y by showing that if y = F and x = 
y, then x = F.  It failed to establish x = y because y = F but x ≠ F.  If Baker is correct, then 
relative identity does not succeed in solving the problem of material constitution. 
 
A lot seems to depend on what intrinsically exactly like means in statement (1).  If it 
means sharing exactly the same parts as or occupying the same space at the same time 
as, then perhaps one can say that x is identical to y or simply that x is y instead of the 
weaker x and y are Fs.  This weaker claim of y is F and x is F because x is intrinsically 
exactly like (or only minutely different from) y, where entities x and y are defined in 
relation to a sortal term F.  On this claim, there is a possibility for x to be intrinsically 
exactly like and yet non-intrinsically unlike y, depending on how the sortal term F is 
defined.  At most, relative identity can only tell us that entities x and y can be classified 
as an F sort.  It tells us whether x and y belong to the same class or kind of things, but 
stops short of telling us directly whether x is in fact identical to y.  My focus here shall be 
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on whether the xs and the fusion of xs are the same object (x = y, assuming y = fusion of 
xs), and not whether x and y belong to the same sort, class or kind (if y = F and x = y, 
then x = F).  Hence, I shall put aside relative identity as a relevant solution to the problem 




In his Constitution is Identity, Harold Noonan argues contra Johnston that the thesis of 
constitution is identity is correct.  He uses the notion of Abelardian Predicates to show 
that the thesis conflict with Leibnizs criterion for identity is only apparent.  According 
to Noonan, an Abelardian predicate is a predicate whose reference can be affected by the 
subject term to which it is attached.  Accepting Abelardian predicates makes it possible to 
maintain that Lumpl is identical to Goliath even though it is true that Lumpl has been 
squeezed into a ball and not destroyed, but false that Goliath might have been squeezed 
into a ball and not destroyed.  This is because one can say that the property denoted by 
the predicate might have been squeezed into a ball and not destroyed in the true 
sentence Lumpl might have been squeezed into a ball and not destroyed is not the same 
as the property as that denoted by that predicate in the false sentence Goliath might have 
been squeezed into a ball and not destroyed. 
 
One way to make sense of Abelardian predicates is through the use of sortal terms.  
Lumpl and Goliath refer to the same statue (sortal term).  The predicate might have been 
squeezed into a ball and not destroyed is true of the statue qua Lumpl, but it is false of 
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the statue qua Goliath.  This solution to the problem of material constitution suggests that 
the problem here is linguistic rather than ontological, for there are actually two (or more) 
ways to describe a material object.  Lumpl and Goliath are just two ways of describing 
the same statue.  From this, Noonan claims that the distinction between Lumpl and 
Goliath are only apparent and their distinction does not render false the fact that Lumpl 
and Goliath refer to the same statue.  Moreover, acceptance of Abelardian predicates is 
not merely an option available to the defenders of the constitution is identity thesis; it is 
the only option available to them. 
 
Lynn Rudder Bakers argument against the notion of Abelardian predicates in her article 
Why Constitution is not Identity? can be formulated as follows: 
 
a. The meaning of the predicate might have been squeezed into a ball and not 
destroyed depends on the meaning of the subject term (Goliath or Lumpl) if and 
only if the meaning of the predicate expressing persistence conditions depends on 
the meaning of the subject term to which it is attached. 
b. It is false that the meaning of a predicate expressing persistence conditions 
depends on the meaning of the subject term to which it is attached. 
c. It is false that the meaning of the predicate of the form might have been squeezed 
into a ball and not destroyed depends on the meaning of the subject term (Goliath 
or Lumpl) to which it is attached. 
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The strength of this argument depends very much on the truth of premise (b).  According 
to Baker, premise (b) is true because Lumpl/Goliath cannot have one set of persistence 
conditions relative to being Goliath (a statue) and another set of persistence conditions 
relative to being Lumpl (a piece of clay). 
 
There seems to be two difficulties with Abelardian predicates here.  First, either the 
predicate might have been squeezed into a ball and not destroyed is true of the statue = 
piece of clay or it is not.  To claim that the predicate is both true and false of the statue 
= piece of clay would be an obvious contradiction, for it amounts to saying that the 
statue = piece of clay squeezed into a ball is both destroyed and not destroyed.  So if the 
predicate is true, then the statue = piece of clay cannot be Goliath and if the predicate is 
false, then the statue = piece of clay cannot be Lumpl.  Second, an Abelardian predicate 
is defined as a predicate whose reference can be affected by the subject term to which it 
is attached.  One can doubt whether the reference of the predicate, might have been 
squeezed into a ball and not destroyed, can mean anything else if the subject term to 
which it is attached changes.  It is difficult to conceive how this predicate can mean one 
thing when it is attached to Lumpl and another when attached to Goliath.  Moreover, 
what else can it mean when it is attached to Goliath? 
 






Co-location is the most direct view under the constitution is not identity theses.  It holds 
that if Lumpl constitutes but is not identical to Goliath, then Lumpl and Goliath are 
simply spatially coincident.  And it accepts the implausible consequence of having two 
objects in the same place at the same time without being related in any other away.  For 
this reason, I reject the notion of co-location as a plausible solution to the problem of 
material constitution.  The co-location theorists might object by saying that there is 
nothing implausible about having two objects in the same place at the same time.  To this 
objection, I raise two questions.  First, do Lumpl and Goliath share the same atoms? Yes 
and because they do, the atoms of Lumpl cannot overlap with those of Goliath and they 
count as one thing.  But this is not necessarily an identity relation and I shall explain why 
later.  Second, can the same atoms constitute two objects in the same place at the same 
time?  No, unless one (constituting) object is part of another (constituted) object.  The 
constituted object refers to the constituting parts and their structural configuration and 
relational properties.  Note that the constituting parts are distinct from the structural 
configuration and relational properties of the constituted object, even when the atoms of 
the constituting parts and the constituted object share exactly the same atoms without 
overlapping.    I shall elaborate on this distinction later.  To make things clear, I shall call 
constituting object the material parts and call constituted object the material object.    
Only a material object and its material parts that share the same atoms can exist in the 
same place at the same time, and no two material objects can be in the same place at the 
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same time.  If this is true, then there is something implausible about having two material 




Michael Rea, in his article Sameness without Identity: an Aristotelian Solution to the 
Problem of Material Constitution, uses Aristotles notion of accidental sameness to 
resolve the problem of material constitution.  According to Aristotle, something called 
seated-Socrates comes into existence as an accidental unity when Socrates sits down.  
Though not a substance, it has a hylomorphic structure: Socrates refers to the matter and 
his seatedness refers to the form or the unifying principle.  It comes into existence when 
seated Socrates is seated and goes out of existence when Socrates is no longer seated.  
The relation of accidental sameness obtains between Socrates and seatedness for only as 
long as they co-exist.  Accidental sameness is not identity but a kind of numerical 
sameness.  This relation is weaker than strict identity but stronger than co-location.  
Necessarily, if x and y are numerically the same at a certain time, then x and y share all 
of their parts in common at that time.  Accidental sameness entails complete overlap of 
parts but co-location does not.  For example, co-location allows an event and a material 
object to fully occupy the same space at the same without complete overlap of parts.  
Accidental sameness occurs whenever some matter is organised in several different ways 
                                                
3 One may argue that there is nothing implausible in having two objects of a different kind, comprised of 
the same atoms, in the same place at the same time.  I agree on one condition, that the object of one kind 
must itself be a part of the object of another kind.  For example, the atomic, chemical and biological 
components (kind) of a person x can be in the same place at the same time, because the atomic component 
(kind) of person x is part of the chemical component (kind) of person x, and the chemical component (kind) 
of person x is part of the biological component (kind) of person x. 
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at once, and whenever it occurs we can identify different kinds of objects in the same 
place but counted as one thing.  It affords us an easy solution to the problem of material 
constitution.  Whenever two objects x and y share all of the same parts but are related to 
their parts in different ways, x and y are numerically the same but not identical. 
 
Rea states that Aristotles notion of accidental sameness has the following facts: (1) it is 
the relation that holds between an accidental unity and its parent substance; (2) it is 
neither necessary identity nor contingent identity (if x and y are accidentally the same, 
they are in some way the same and in some way different; but if x and y are necessarily 
or contingently identical, there is no way in which they are different); and (3) it is a 
version of numerical sameness (if x and y are accidentally the same, then the are one in 
number even if they are not one in being).  Elaborating on the fact (3), Rea says that 
we should count only one object in every region that filled by matter unified in some 
object-constituting way.  We count one Goliath in every region that is filled by matter 
arranged Goliath-wise; we count one Lumpl in every region that is filled by matter 
arranged lumpl-wise; and we count one object in every region that is filled by matter 
arranged in either or both of these object-constituting ways.  Thus, when we recognise 
Goliath and Lumpl in a particular region and deny that Goliath is identical with Lumpl, 
we are committed to the claim that there is matter in a particular region arranged both 
Goliath-wise and Lumpl-wise, and so being Goliath is something different from being 
Lumpl; but this is all consistent with there being one object in a particular region. 
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There are difficulties with this view.  Aristotle tells us that accidental unity and its parent 
substance are one in number but not one in being at the same time.  One can question 
how two or more beings existing in the same place at the same time can count as one 
entity.  Aristotles example says that a seated-Socrates comes into existence on top of 
the Socrates-proper when seated and goes out of existence when he is no longer sitting.  
It seems problematic that there can be a indefinite number of Socrates accidental unities, 
perhaps one for standing, one for walking, one for sleeping etc to be treated as many 
different beings but counted as one thing.  A related difficulty is that how can matter be 
arranged in more than one way (both Lumpl-wise and Goliath-wise) in the same place at 
the same time?  And given an indefinite number of accidental unities of Socrates, which 
one counts as Socrates-proper (parent substance, primary being) in the first place?  A 
more plausible alternative would be to treat all the accidental unities as different states 
(rather than different beings coming in and out of existence) of one material object 
constituted by material parts.  The material object is capable of being in different states as 
a result of the material parts being arranged in different ways, thereby making the 
material object qualitatively distinct from its constitutive parts.  I would elaborate on this 
view later in this chapter. 
 
Bakers Essentialist Argument against Constitution is Identity Thesis 
 
In her article Why Constitution is not Identity? Lynn Rudder Baker put forward an 




a. x is essentially an F. 
b. y is not essentially an F. 
c. x ≠ y 
 
Applying this to Gibbards example, we have 
 
d. Goliath is essentially a statue. 
e. Lumpl (a piece of clay) is not essentially a statue. 
f. Goliath ≠ Lumpl 
 
Premise (d) affirms that anything that existed and was not a statue (at all times of its 
existence) would not be a statue.  It holds that being a statue is a property that a statue 
cannot lose without going out of existence, just as being three-sided is a property a 
triangle cannot lose without going out of existence.  And it entails that if a particular 
statue (Goliath) ceases to be a paradigm statue (sortal term), then it goes out of existence.  
Hence, being a statue is essential to (or is definitive of) Goliath.  Premise (e) affirms that 
it is possible that Lumpl (a piece of clay that constitutes Goliath) exists and is not a 
statue.  A piece of clay can be used to construct many things other than a statue.  Hence, 
being a statue is not essential to (or is not definitive of) Lumpl.  Taken together, premises 
(d) and (e) states that Goliath has an essential property that Lumpl lacks.  And inserting 
the hidden premise in the form of Leibnizs criterion for identity, we have conclusion (f): 
Goliath ≠ Lumpl.  That is, (d) and (e) entail (f).  The argument seems valid. 
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Baker then discusses an essentialist argument for the Constitution is Identity thesis as a 
criticism against her essentialist argument against the Constitution is Identity thesis: 
 
g. x is essentially an F 
h. x = y 
i. y is essentially an F 
 
Applying this Gibbards example, we have 
 
j. Goliath is essentially a statue 
k. Goliath = Lumpl 
l. Lumpl is essentially a statue 
 
My own criticism against constitution as relative identity is that (h) is assumed to be true 
and is used as a premise to establish (i), or that (k) is assumed to be true and is used as a 
premise to establish (l).  The problem of material constitution as I see it is to show 
whether or not (h) and (k) are true, and not whether or not (i) and (l) are true.  In other 
words, the essentialist argument for the Constitution is Identity thesis begs the question 
against the problem of material constitution as I see it.  Baker holds that the opposite 
conclusion that Lumpl is not essentially a statue is stronger the premise Lumpl = Goliath 
because of a modal intuition that Lumpl could have existed without being a statue. Again, 
a piece of clay can be used to construct many things other than a statue.  This argument is 
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similar to the one offered by the constitution as relative identity view above and Bakers 
criticism here is applicable against it.  If Bakers constitution without identity view is 
correct, then Lumpl is not identical with Goliath because they possess a different 
essential property and persistence condition.  But how would Baker then account for two 
distinct objects existing in the same place at the same time?  In what follows, I would 
present Baker constitution without identity view and assess its success in answering this 
question. 
 
Bakers Constitution without Identity Thesis and the Problem of Material Constitution  
 
In her article Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution, Baker states 
the problem of material constitution in the following way: For any x and y that are related 
as the piece of clay is to the statue that it makes up, either x is identical to y, or x and y 
are separate entities, independent of each other.  She defines her position in between 
identity and separation.  She rejects identity by stating that if x constitutes y, then x ≠ y.  
This is because x and y could have different essential properties and persistence 
conditions.  She rejects separation by holding that if x constitutes y, then they share many 
properties are spatially coincident.  Hence, they are too closely related to be separate. 
 
Lets elaborate this view using Gibbards example.  For Baker, identity is a necessary 
relation between objects.  That is, if x = y, then necessarily x = y, and so x cannot differ 
from y in any respect, including respects in which x might have been, or might become, 
different from the way this is now.  In other words, x and y share their modal properties  
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which are properties of being possibly such and such, or of necessarily being such and 
such.  If Lumpl and Goliath were identical, then by Leibnizs criterion for identity, there 
would be no property borne by Lumpl but not borne by Goliath, and no property borne by 
Goliath and not borne by Lumpl.  But Lumpl could have existed without being a statue 
but Goliath could not.  And Goliath has the aesthetic qualities essential to a statue but 
Lumpl has not.  There is then a property borne by Lumpl but not Goliath, and a property 
borne by Goliath but not Lumpl.  Therefore, the relationship between Lumpl and Goliath 
cannot be defined as identity.  (See Bakers Essentialist Argument discussed above.) 
 
The alternative seems to be one of separation (co-location), that Lumpl and Goliath are 
separate and independent individuals located in the same place at the same time.  Baker 
disagrees and argues that Lumpl and Goliath are not just two independent individuals for 
two reasons.  First, many of Goliaths aesthetic properties depend on Lumpls physical 
properties  its weight distribution and shape.  Second, Lumpl and Goliath are spatially 
coincident.  Not only are they located in the same place at the same time, they have the 
same size, weight, shape, colour, texture and so on.  Their similarity is no accident (hence 
rejects accidental sameness discussed above), for Goliath does not exists separately from 
Lumpl.  Baker further argues that neither Goliath has Lumpl as a proper part nor Goliath 
is Lumpl plus something else.  Hence, Lumpl is neither identical to nor separate from 
Goliath.  Rather, the relation between Lumpl and Goliath is one of constitution. 
 
Bakers constitution thesis has three important assumptions.  First, constitution is a 
relation between two individual objects.  Neither stuff (component parts of objects) nor 
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properties (features possessed by objects) are relata of the constitution relation.  The 
statue Goliath (an object) and a piece of clay Lumpl (another object) figure as the relata 
in a constitution relation.  The relation between Goliath (an object) and its clay parts 
(stuff), or the relation between Lumpl (an object) and its shape (properties) are not one of 
constitution.  Here, it is quite clear that Baker rejects mereology  the thesis that the parts 
constitute the whole.  Second, constitution is a contingent relation: Lumpl could have 
existed yet failed to constitute anything at all.  If x constitutes y at some time, then the 
existence of x at that time does not by itself entail the existence of y.  Third, many of the 
relational properties (e.g. aesthetic appeal) that make something (e.g. Goliath) the thing 
that it is (an art piece) are intentional.  Baker defines an intentional property as follows: a 
property H is intentional if and only if H could not be exemplified in a world where no 
one ever one had a belief, desire, or any propositional attitude.  Baker departs from 
tradition in taking certain relational and intentional properties to be essential properties.  
For example, Lumpl could exist in the absence of an art world but Goliath could not.  In 
other words, it is essential for Goliath to be an art piece but not Lumpl.  It is important 
also to recognise that not all constituted things are intentional. 
 
Bakers constitution thesis has three following ideas  primary kinds, circumstances 
and borrowed properties.  First, Baker requires the idea of primary kinds because 
constitution is a relation between two individual objects, and each individual object is 
fundamentally a member of exactly one kind, called a primary kind.  To cite the question 
what is fundamentally or essentially x? we cite xs primary kind by using a subject 
noun, for example a piece of clay or a statue.  A primary kind is a kind of thing and 
 42
not just stuff (component parts of things) or properties (features possessed by things).  An 
important feature of a primary kind is that an individual object ceases to exist if its 
primary kind (essential) property ceases to exist.  Second, Baker requires an idea of 
circumstances to answer the question in virtue of what is x the kind of thing that it is?  
Many properties can be instantiated only in certain circumstances.  Baker formulates this 
idea as follows: where F (Lumpl) and G (Goliath) are distinct primary kind properties, it 
is possible that F (Lumpl) exists without any spatially coincidental G (Goliath).  
However, if an F (Lumpl) is in G-favourable circumstances, then there is a new entity, a 
G (Goliath), that is spatially identical to F (Lumpl) but not identical to it.  Third, Baker 
requires the idea of borrowed properties to answer the following question: suppose that 
object x has property H, in virtue of what does x has H?  Bakers answer is that x has H 
in virtue of constituting something that has H or being constituted by something that has 
H.  An important feature of constitution requires a distinction between properties that are 
borrowed and properties that are not borrowed.  Baker formulates the idea of borrowed 
property as follows: Suppose objects x (Lumpl) and y (Goliath) are constitutionally 
related, H (aesthetic appeal) is a borrowed property of x (Lumpl) at t if x (Lumpl) having 
H (aesthetic appeal) at t derives exclusively from xs (Lumpls) being constitutionally 
related at t to y (Goliath) that has H (aesthetic appeal) independently at t.  The idea of 
borrowed property is essential to Bakers account because x (lumpl) and y (Goliath) are 
seen as distinct objects even when they are related constitutionally. 
 
In her constitution without identity thesis, Baker succeeded in explaining the qualitative 
differences (essential properties / persistence conditions) between two constitutionally 
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related items and in establishing the intimate relation between them.  But in conceiving 
constitutionally related items as distinct objects (primary kinds) borrowing properties 
from each other, the problem of there being two objects occupying the same space at the 
same time remained.  To address this problem, Bakers critics have urged her to define 
constitution as a mereological relation, which she rejected.  I would want to explore the 
idea of constitution as a mereological relation without identity next and assess its success 
as a solution to the problem of material constitution. 
 
Constitution is Mereological Relation without Identity Thesis 
 
Merelogical Relation and Identity Statements 
 
As indicated earlier, my focus here is to specify the relationship between the material 
parts and the material object they constitute, or between xs and the fusion of xs.  The 
constitutive relation between xs and the fusion of xs is best construed as a mereological 
relation without identity.  I believe that this is the most plausible solution to the problem 
of material constitution, where qualitative differences can be adequately accounted for 
without admitting that it is possible for two objects to occupy the same space at the same 
time.  I would like to formulate a notion of mereological relation without identity by 
defining it against the various statements of identity relation between the material object 
and the material parts that constitute it as follows: 
 
1. Xs and the fusion of xs occupy the same space at the same time. 
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2. What affects xs affects the fusion of xs and vice versa. 
3. Xs and the fusion of xs share the same parts. 
4. Xs and the fusion of xs count as one thing. 
5. The fusion of xs exists when xs exist. 
6. The fusion of xs is nothing more than the xs. 
7. The fusion of xs is not distinct from the xs. 
8. The fusion of xs is fully described when xs are described. 
 
To accept all these points is to accept strict identity between xs and the fusion of xs as 
spelt out by Lewis above.  For those who accept Leibnizs criterion of identity, it is not 
possible to accept (1) to (4) and reject (5) to (8) at the same time.  They hold that the truth 
of points (1) to (4) entails the truth of points (5) to (8).  But in accepting (5) to (8), strict 
identity cannot account for the possibility that xs and the fusion of xs can have at least 
one differing property (qualitative distinction).  I am inclined to accept points (1) to (4) 
without qualifications and reject points (5) to (8) outright.  To do this, I have to make an 
important distinction between the material parts that make up the material object and 
ways the material object are.  John Heil made this distinction in his book From an 
Ontological Point of View.  I hold that xs refer only to the material parts that make up 
the material object but the fusion of xs includes both the material parts that make up the 
material object as well as the ways the material objects are.  It is my acceptance of this 
mereological relation (xs are parts of the fusion of xs) that commits me to the points (1) 
to (4) and it is my denial of qualitative identity that leads me to reject points (5) to (8).    
In what follows, I will first discuss how the remaining notions of identity would treat 
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these eight points and then elaborate on my treatment of these eight points which defines 
my solution to the problem of material constitution. 
 
Identity Statements and the Constitution as Identity Theses 
 
The notion of contingent identity would accept points (1) to (8) in describing the relation 
between xs and the fusion of xs, but not necessarily.  It is possible that any or all points 
from (1) to (8) do not describe the relation between xs and fusion of xs.  That is, it is just 
incidental that xs and the fusion of xs are identical but it remains possible that xs and the 
fusion of xs are not identical.  If points (1) to (8) apply to the relationship between xs and 
the fusion of xs and they are hence identical, then it is not possible for them to be distinct 
objects.  Rejecting the identity relation would mean that it is possible for two distinct 
objects to occupy the same place at the same time, which is highly implausible.  Since 
contingent identity accepts that it is possible for xs and fusion of xs to be distinct objects, 
and thereby accepts the possibility of having two distinct objects occupying the same 
place at the same time, I reject it.  In my view, the mereological relation between xs and 
the fusion of xs (that xs are parts of the fusion of xs) implies that they are not two objects 
occupying the same space at the same time.  And the mereological relation allows for the 
possibility of qualitative distinction between xs and the fusion of xs. 
 
The notion of relative identity would define a sortal term F and then determine whether 
xs is intrinsically exactly like F and whether the fusion of xs is intrinsically exactly like 
F.  If xs is intrinsically exactly like F and the fusion of xs is intrinsically exactly like F, 
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then both xs and the fusion of xs are identical in relation to sortal term F.  At most, this 
tells us that xs and the fusion of xs belong to the same sort, class or type of things. It does 
not tell us whether points (1) and (8) describe the relation between xs and the fusion of 
xs, and stops short of telling us whether or not xs and the fusion of xs are the same object.  
And if relative identity cannot establish whether or not xs and the fusion of xs are the 
same object, then it has failed to solve the problem of material constitution as I see it. 
 
The Abelardian predicates thesis seems to accept points (1) to (6) as xs and the fusions of 
xs refer to the same object, even when there are two different senses in talking about 
them.  Abelardian predicates seem to be incompatible with (7) and (8) because xs and the 
fusion of xs can have apparently distinct properties and hence predicates with different 
references depending on how the subject term is defined.  Hence, xs and the fusion of xs 
can be described in different ways even when they are identical.  But if Baker is correct, 
then it is possible for xs and fusion of xs (different senses of referring to one object) to 
have different persistence conditions (different senses of referring to one predicate) 
according to Abelardian predicates.  If it is possible for xs and the fusion of xs to have 
different persistence conditions, then it is possible for one to exist whiles the other ceases 
to exist.  And if it is possible for one to exist while the other ceases to exist, then they 
cannot be the same object.  Bakers counter argument shows that xs and the fusion of xs 
have concrete differences  their persistence conditions.  So, the notion of Abelardian 
predicates cannot show whether or not xs and the fusion of xs are the very same object.  




Identity Statements and the Constitution Without Identity Theses 
 
The notion of accidental sameness is construed as a kind of numerical sameness. This 
relation is weaker than strict identity but stronger than co-location.  It seems to accept 
points (1) to (4) and affirms numerical sameness.  Accidental sameness occurs whenever 
some matter is organised in several different ways at once, and whenever it occurs we can 
identify different kinds of objects in the same place but counted as one thing.  Whenever 
xs and the fusion of xs share all of the same parts but are related to their parts in different 
ways, x and y are numerically the same but not identical.  And whenever we recognise xs 
and the fusion of xs in a particular region and deny that xs is identical with the fusion of 
xs, we are committed to the claim that there is matter in the region arranged both in the 
ways of xs and the fusion of xs, and being xs is something different from being the fusion 
of xs.  My questions here are twofold.  First, if xs and the fusion of xs share all of the 
same parts, how can they be different objects?  Second, if xs and the fusions of xs are 
different kinds of objects (even if some are accidental) in the same place at the same 
time, how can they be the same numerically?  In holding that xs and the fusion of xs 
share all the same parts, and that there can only be one object in the same place at the 
same time necessarily, I reject the notion of accidental sameness.  Instead, I believe that 
mereological relation fulfils these two conditions better. 
 
Bakers position accepts points (1) and (2) and denies the rest.  Her rejection of (3) and 
(4) is based on the assumption that the relatas of the constitution relation are distinct 
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objects with different essential properties, in particular persistence conditions.  Her 
rejection of (5) and (6) is based on the assumption that constitution is a contingent 
relation  it is possible for xs to exist without becoming the fusion of xs, and the fusion of 
xs only come into existence when xs are in certain circumstances.  Her rejection of (7) 
and (8) can be explained by the assumption that fusion of xs can have certain relational or 
intentional properties which xs lacked.  As a result, her position is that xs and the fusion 
of xs are constitutionally related without being identical.  Although Baker insists that xs 
and the fusion of xs are constitutionally related, she accepts the implausible view that xs 
and the fusion of xs are two distinct objects occupying the same space at the same time.  
This implausible view can be avoided by holding that xs and the fusion of xs are 
mereologically related without being identical. 
 
Identity Statements and Constitution as Mereological Relation without Identity 
 
My position is that constitution is a mereological relation without identity.  Affirming 
mereological relation by accepting points (1) to (4) is essential to avoid the implausible 
position that there are two objects occupying the same space at the same time.  To 
establish mereological relation, I need points (1) and (3) to arrive at point (4), and later 
derive point (2) from point (4).  If xs and the fusion of xs occupy the same space at the 
same time and if xs and the fusion of xs share the same parts, then xs and the fusion of xs 
count as one thing.  And if xs and the fusion of xs count as one thing, then what affects xs 
affects the fusion of xs and vice versa.  My view differs from Bakers in affirming (3)  
the mereological relation between xs and the fusion of xs; and affirming (4)  the denial 
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of xs and the fusion of xs as different but co-located and constitutionally related objects.  
I believe that the relatas of any constitution relation are not distinct objects but rather 
material parts and material objects (= fusion of material parts = material parts configured 
in certain ways under certain circumstances possessing certain relational properties  
dispositions and qualities).  That is, material object = material parts + ways the materials 
parts are; and ways material parts are = structural configurations of material parts + 
relational properties (dispositions and qualities).  By structural configuration, I mean the 
arrangement and organisation of material parts when conceived statically, as well as the 
connections and interactions between material parts when conceived dynamically.  When 
material parts are structurally configured in certain ways under certain circumstances, it 
possesses certain relational properties (at the level of material object) not possessed by its 
material parts. 
 
Having drawn this distinction between xs (material parts) and the fusion of xs (material 
objects), I am in a position to reject points (5) to (8).4  Rejecting qualitative identity by 
rejecting points (5) to (8) is essential to account for the qualitative differences between xs 
(material parts) and the fusion of xs (material objects).  I reject point (5) because the 
material parts can still exist without constituting the material object.  It is possible that the 
material parts lack the fusion or the structural configuration under certain circumstances 
to be the material object.  Point (6) is rejected for the similar reason because the material 
                                                
4 One may argue that the simultaneous acceptance of (1) and rejection of (5) is inconsistent. I disagree.  
Acceptance of (1) affirms that xs and fusion of xs occupy the same place at the same time as they share 
exactly the same atoms.  While both xs and fusion of xs include the exact same atomic parts, xs excludes 
the configuration of these atomic parts and their relational properties but fusion of xs includes them.  This 
is consistent with the rejection of (5), which denies that fusion of xs exists when xs exists, because it is 
possible for the atomic parts (xs) to exist without the configuration of these atomic parts and their relational 
properties (all of which are necessary for fusions of xs to exist) at the same time. 
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parts may lack the fusion or structural configuration under certain circumstances to be the 
material object.  But rejection of points (5) and (6) are compatible with the mereological 
relation between xs and the fusion of xs.  The whole (material object) is simply ways the 
material parts are and there is qualitative difference between material parts and ways the 
material parts are.  Point (7) is rejected because the material object (= fusion of material 
parts = material parts configured in certain ways under certain circumstances possessing 
certain relational properties  dispositions and qualities) encompasses more than its 
material parts and hence is distinct from them.  Point (8) is rejected for the similar reason 
 exactly because material objects encompass more than its material parts, material 
objects cannot be fully described by its parts.  Again, rejection of points (7) and (8) are 
compatible with the mereological relation, for the material parts are the constituents of 
the material object. 
 
The mereological relation I hold differs significantly from the widely held constitution as 
identity view.  According to the identity view, parts that constitute the whole are seen as 
identical to the whole.  Let parts (xs) be x, whole (fusion of xs) be y, and let y be part of a 
greater whole z.  Read this way, the mereological relation between x, y and z are: 
 
a. Reflexive  x is identical to itself. 
b. Symmetric  if x is identical to y, then y is identical to x. 
c. Transitive  if x is identical to y, and y is identical to z, then x is identical to z. 
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According to my constitution without identity view, parts that constitute the whole are 
not seen as identical to the whole.  Read this way, the mereological relation between x, y 
and z are: 
 
d. Irreflexive  x does not constitute itself. 
e. Asymmetric  if x constitutes y, then y does not constitute x. 
f. Transitive  if x constitutes y, and y constitutes z, then x constitutes z. 
 
Baker held a similar view that the constitution relation is irreflexive, asymmetric and 
transitive but she does not conceive the constitution relation as a mereological relation.  
My view of mereological relation has another feature: 
 
g. Non-causal  if x constitutes y, then x does not cause y (in the efficient sense). 
 
Applying my position to Gibbards example, Lumpl refers to the material parts (xs) and 
Goliath refers to the material object (fusion of xs).  Acceptance of points (1) to (4) makes 
Lumpl a part of (mereologically related to) Goliath.  Denial of points (5) to (8) makes 
Lumpl qualitatively distinct from Goliath, because Goliath (a statue) refers to Lumpl (a 
piece of clay) in a specific configuration under circumstances with specific dispositions 
and qualities.   Lumpl does not constitute itself.  Rather, Lumpl is constituted by atoms 
(components other than itself) and is hence irreflexive.  Lumpl constitutes Goliath when 
it has certain configuration, dispositions and qualities but Goliath (that includes structural 
configuration and relational properties) does not constitute Lumpl (that does not include 
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structural configuration and relational properties).5  Hence, the relationship between 
Lumpl and Goliath is asymmetric.  And if Lumpl constitutes Goliath, then Lumpl does 
not (efficiently) cause Goliath.  Hence, the relationship between Lumpl and Goliath are 
non-causal. 
 
My position can be contrasted with the key notions of Bakers view.  First, I refrain from 
using the term primary kinds as specified by Baker, where they refer to kinds of things 
and cannot be parts or properties.6 Concepts of material parts, structural configuration 
and relational properties (dispositions and qualities) figure significantly in my view of 
constitution.  Baker denies this view because she rejects mereology.  Second, I believe 
that Lumpl and Goliath are not two distinct, co-located, and constitutionally related 
primary kinds borrowing properties from one another.  Rather, the constituted material 
object (Goliath) is made up of the constituting material parts (Lumpl) structurally 
configured in certain ways with certain relational properties (dispositions and qualities), 
located in one particular space at a particular time.  Third, I do agree with Bakers notion 
of circumstances  that certain environmental situations can be conditions for material 
parts taking on certain structural configurations.  Fourth, my view is compatible with 
Bakers view that Lumpl and Goliath maybe qualitatively different and may even have 
different persistence conditions.  Lumpl that loses its structural configuration and 
                                                
5 Lumpl and Goliath are constituted by exactly the same atoms and hence occupy the same space at the 
same time.  The distinction between Lumpl and Goliath lies in that Goliath refers to the atomic parts, the 
ways they are arranged, as well as the possession of relational properties when the atomic parts are so 
arranged, while Lumpl refers only the atomic parts.  Unlike atoms, configuration and relational properties 
(conceived as dispositions and qualities) do not occupy space but this does not mean that they do not exist. 
6 I believe that primary kinds can both constitute other primary kinds or be constituted by other primary 
kinds.  Constituting primary kinds refer to parts and constituted primary kinds refer to wholes (or objects).  
But I refrain from using the term primary kinds in my essay to avoid the misconception that primary kinds 
always refer to independent objects (or wholes) and not parts. 
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relational properties but retains its material parts may still persist as a piece of clay even 
if it ceases to be Goliath.  Conversely, Goliath may not persist when Lumpl ceases to 
exist because Lumpl is the material part of Goliath.  When the material parts ceases to 
exist, its structural configuration and relational properties would cease to exist as well. 
 
Let us now return to Lewis question raised in the first section of this paper: is mereology 
ontologically innocent?  If we accept the constitution is identity thesis, that mereological 
relation is reflexive and symmetric, then it is certain that mereology is innocent.  Bakers 
constitution without identity thesis rejects mereology precisely because of its innocence.  
On my constitution as mereological relation but not identity view, where mereological 
relation is both irreflexive and asymmetric, the answer is both yes and no.  On the one 
hand, the answer is yes because: 
 
a. If fusion of xs (Xf) = aggregates of x parts (X1, X2, X3), then Xf is composed of 
no other non-overlapping material parts in addition to X1, X2, and X3. 
b. If fusion of xs (Xf) = aggregates of x parts (X1, X2, X3), then Xf decomposes 
exhaustively into non-overlapping material parts X1, X2 and X3. 
 
On the other hand, the answer is no because Xf does not refer only to its material parts 
X1, X2, and X3, but also to the structural configuration of the material parts X1, X2 and 
X3 that possess certain relational properties.  For an adequate account of ontology, we 
must take into account the material parts, the structural configuration, as well as the 
relational properties of material objects.  The structural configuration and relational 
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properties of Xf do not add additional material (or nonmaterial) parts to Xf, they are just 
ways Xf is.  In their article The Ontological Turn, C.B. Martin and John Heil put it in 
the following way: 
 
Objects can have parts, but an objects properties are not its parts, they are the 
particular ways the object is. (C.B. Martin and John Heil 1999, P.45) 
 
As the material object refers to more than just its material parts, mereology is not as 
innocent as Lewis wants it to be. 
 
Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Nihilism and Merelogical Supervenience 
 
At this juncture, I would like to explore how my position relates to the other mereological 
theses: mereological nihilism (MN), mereological essentialism (ME) and mereological 
supervenience (MS).  In particular, I would like to reject MN by insisting that mereology 
is crucial for an adequate account of ontology, reject ME by insisting that they are not 
necessarily entailed by mereology, and accept a non-identical or non-reductive notion of 
MS. 
 
Mereological Nihilism  (MN) 
 
MN is the view that objects with parts do not exist and only basic building blocks without 
parts exist.  The world only contains stuffs or masses of matter and they come in different 
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quantities.  Our standard way of quantifying is at most a way for the mind to project 
individual object and part distinctions onto the world and it is our misconception to see 
the world as full of objects with parts.  MN amounts to a denial of mereology.  Peter 
Unger argues for this position in his paper There are No Ordinary Things.  In my view, 
the world consists of material objects and the ways they are.  The ways material objects 
are are accounted for by their structural configurations and relational properties 
(dispositions and qualities).  The world does not consist of stuffs or masses of matter 
simply categorised into objects and parts arbitrarily by our minds.  Rather, stuffs or 
masses of matter are organised into myriad individual structural configurations with 
certain relational properties (dispositions and qualities); and it is material parts that figure 
in the structural configurations of material objects.7  As mentioned earlier, an adequate 
account of ontology must include the material parts, their structural configurations, as 
well as the relational properties (dispositions and qualities) of material objects.  In 
denying mereology, MN is unable to offer an adequate account of ontology.  Thus, 
mereology is required for a plausible account of constitution. 
 
Mereological Essentialism (ME) 
 
ME is the view that objects have their parts essentially  that is, if an object would lose 
(or gain) a part, it would cease to exist.  Roderick Chisholm argues for ME in his paper 
                                                
7 Some philosophers who emphasises Kants transcendental idealism thesis may argue that it is our mind 
that structure reality according to the categories and hence perceptual and conceptual distinctions are made 
in our mental representations of reality.  Without the mind and its categories to make such distinctions, 
reality could just be stuffs or masses of matter.  I disagree because I emphasises Kants objectivity thesis  
that reality consists of objects (and not just stuffs or masses of matter) existing independently of perceivers, 
even though we represent them according to the categories.  It is worth noting that according to Kant, both 
theses are necessary conditions for experience. 
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Parts as Essential to their Wholes.  The idea is this: rejection of ME means that objects 
could survive the loss and replacement of its parts but we would not know how much loss 
or replacement of parts objects could take before it would cease to exist.  And the best 
way to avoid this problem would be to accept ME.  One objection raised is that if ME is 
true, then no objects could survive change.  This makes change in objects impossible.  
ME holds that objects cease to exist whenever they lose (or gain) an atom and new 
related objects constantly arise to take their place, thus introducing a new problem of the 
many.  If it is true that objects change by losing and gaining parts and properties, then 
ME is false.  Also, rejecting ME avoids the counterintuitive view that objects constantly 
cease to exist and replaced by other related objects whenever they lose (or gain) an atom.  
The problem of rejecting ME arises from our definition or conception an object as a rigid 
or fixed set of parts or atoms rather than the nature of objects themselves.  And I advocate 
a more flexible and fluid way of defining and conceiving objects as well as their parts and 
properties  that it is possible for an object to loose or gain some parts or atoms (change 
or be qualitatively different) over time.  While admitting that objects cease to exist when 
they lose significant parts, configurations and properties, I would assert that they survive 
the loss of certain parts, configurations and properties.  There is no question of objects 
surviving the loss of some of their parts.  Alvin Plantinga, in his paper On Mereological 
Essentialism, provides an excellent example to this flexible and fluid view.  As 
organisms, human beings survive by having our parts replaced by metabolism (cell 
replacement), tissue/organ transplants, or even cutting and regeneration of our fingernails 
and hair.  All these processes do not seem to lead to the cessation of the human beings 
existence.  Perhaps a person could not survive the loss of their brain.  It is worth noting 
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that mereological relation is retained.  Biological systems, organs, tissue and cells remain 
part of the human organism despite loss and replacement of certain parts.  Hence, 
mereology does not necessarily entail ME. 
 
Mereological Supervenience (MS) 
 
In his Physicalism and Panexperientialism: Response to David Ray Griffin, Jaegwon 
Kim says of MS: 
 
Mereological supervenience only asserts that the properties of the whole are 
determined, or fixed, by the properties and relations that characterise its parts.  That 
only means that if two wholes are microstructurally identical, they must exhibit the same 
macroproperties  and the same causal powers.  And these can be new causal powers; it 
is only that they are determined by microstructure.  Mereological supervenience does not 
say, or imply, that the properties of the whole are identical with properties of their 
microconstituents.  As emergentists too would say: such properties as inflammability, 
ductility, and temperature of macro-objects are not among the properties of individual 
molecules or atoms.  For both emergentists and (most) physicalists, they are genuine 
properties and causal powers, which supervene on, or are determined by the 
microstructural make-up of the objects that have them.  Emergentists and physicalists 
would stress that the structural configuration, no less than the intrinsic properties of 
microconstituents, is crucial determining what macro-properties are exhibited by a 
whole.  For wholes  anyway, those of interest to us  are structures, not mere 
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assemblages of atoms and particles, and the very same atoms and particles configured in 
different structural relationships can, and do, exhibit very different properties and causal 
powers at the level of wholes.  And many of these properties are not had by the wholes 
microconstituents.  This is completely consistent with physicalism and in particular 
mereological supervenience and micro-reductionism.  Thus two points: first, determinism 
must be sharply distinguished from identity, and second, structure is crucially 
important. (Jaegwon Kim 1999, P.33-34) 
 
According to Kim, MS asserts that the properties of the whole are determined by, fixed 
by, or dependent on and at the same time not possessed by, identical with, or reducible to 
the properties of its parts or their structural configuration.  In causal terms, MS asserts 
that the causal powers of the macroproperties of the whole are determined by, fixed by, 
or dependent on and at the same time not possessed by, identical with, or reducible to the 
causal powers of microproperties of its parts or their structural configuration.  When the 
microproperties of parts possess certain structural configuration, the whole possesses new 
and genuine macroproperties.  In this way, MS does not imply a causal relation between 
the whole and its parts.  This is because if the microproperties of the parts and structural 
configuration and the whole and its macroproperties are instantiated at the same time, 
then both the microproperties of the parts and structural configuration and the whole 
and its macroproperties do not figure as the antecedent of (prior to) or the consequent of 
(posterior to) one another in a conditional (causal) relation.  So, the casual powers of the 
whole and its macroproperties are conserved even when they are determined or fixed by 
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the microproperties of the parts and their structural configuration.  Kim makes this point 
clear in his Mind in a Physical World with examples: 
 
This table has a mass of ten kilograms, and this property, that of having a mass of ten 
kilograms, represents a well-defined set of causal powers.  But no micro-constituent of 
this table, none of its proper parts, has this property of the causal powers it represents.  
H2O molecules have causal powers that no oxygen or hydrogen atoms have.  A neural 
assembly consisting of many thousands of neurons will have properties whose causal 
powers go beyond the causal powers of the properties of its constituent neurons, or 
subassemblies, and human beings have causal powers that none of our individual organs 
have.  Clearly then macro-properties can, and in general do, have their own causal 
powers, powers that go beyond the causal powers of their micro-constituents. (Jaegwon 
Kim 1998, P.85) 
 
It is clear that Kim does not equate MS with mereological reduction, and he does not 
identify the whole with the sum of its parts.  What MS amounts to is this: MS asserts that 
certain constituting material parts in certain structural configurations are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the constituted whole and its relational properties, in such a way 
that when certain constituting material parts in certain structural configurations are 
instantiated, the constituted whole and its relational properties are instantiated.  This non-




Constitution and its Implication for the Mind-Body Problem 
 
Bakers Constitution View of the Person and the Mind-Body Problem 
 
In On Making Things Up: Constitution and Its Critics, Lynn Rudder Baker refines her 
constitution thesis to construct a plausible view of the human person, to derive a plausible 
solution to the mind-body problem, and to defend her thesis against critics.  The main 
idea of constitution is this: when a thing of one primary kind is in certain circumstances, 
a thing of another kind  a new thing with new causal powers  comes to exist.  It 
describes the relationship between pieces of clay and statues, and DNA molecules and 
genes.  When a certain combination of chemicals is in a certain environment, then a new 
thing  an organism  comes into existence.  And when an organism evolves in certain 
ways, then a new thing  a person  comes into existence.  But a statue is a different kind 
of thing from a piece of clay, a gene is a different kind of thing from DNA molecules, an 
organism is a different kind of thing from the combination of chemicals, and a person is a 
different kind of thing from the organism.  Constitution makes an ontological difference.  
When a piece of clay constitutes a statue, it does not acquire the property of being a 
statue.  Rather, a new kind with new causal powers and new persistence conditions  a 
statue  constituted by that piece of clay, comes into existence.  Similarly, when an 
organism constitutes a person, it does not acquire the property of being a person.  Instead, 
a person  a new kind with new causal powers and persistence conditions  comes into 
existence.  Constitution relation is asymmetric.  The piece of clay constitutes the statue 
and not vice versa.  And the organism constitutes the person and not vice versa.  This 
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asymmetry introduces some sort of ontological hierarchy.  As one kind ascends the 
ontological ladder, it possesses greater causal powers and greater ontological 
significance.  The asymmetry of constitution relation implies its non-reductionism. 
 
Baker differentiates the constitution view from substance dualism in the following ways.  
First, substance dualism implies that there are two basic kinds of things but Bakers 
constitution view holds that there are countless basic kinds of things that cannot be 
reduced to two.  Second, substance dualism conceives mind as an immaterial substance 
and body as a material substance but the constitution thesis holds that the mind is not a 
substance at all.  Only the person and the body are substances, both of which are fully 
material, and neither of which are bearer of mental properties.  Hence, the constitution 
view can be seen as a materialist account of the physical world.  Third, substance dualism 
regards the relation between mind and body as causal but Baker holds that the 
relationship between person and body is non-causal.  Baker then states three reasons to 
accept the constitution view of material objects.  First, the constitution view is a 
comprehensive view of the natural world and it enables a plausible formulation of the 
materialism thesis: Materialism is true if and only if every concrete thing that exists at t is 
either a fundamental particle or is ultimately constituted by an aggregate of fundamental 
particles at t.  So construed, materialism is compatible with the constitution view.  
Second, the constitution view is able to account for the different kinds of things in the 
world.  It does not explain away the things that everyone believes exist and cannot avoid 
believing exist.  So, a view that recognises the existence of many kinds is more natural 
than one that does not.  Third, the constitution view is able to situate persons in the 
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natural word without detaching them from their animal nature.  Both humans and animals 
are similar biological kinds. 
 
Constitution as Mereological Relation without Identity and the Mind-Body Problem 
 
For Baker, the idea of constitution is this: when a thing of one primary kind (a piece of 
clay) is in certain circumstances, a thing of another kind (a statue)  a new thing with new 
causal powers  comes to exist.    Similarly in the person-body relation: when a certain 
combination of chemicals is in a certain environment, then a new thing  an organism 
with new causal powers and persistence conditions  comes into existence, and when an 
organism evolves in certain ways, then a new thing  a person with new causal powers 
and persistence conditions  comes into existence.  Constitution makes an ontological 
difference.  As a thing of one primary kind ascends the ontological ladder, it possesses 
greater causal powers and greater ontological significance.  We can decipher a layered 
model of reality in Bakers position, where chemical kinds constitute biological kinds 
with greater causal powers (human bodies) under certain circumstances, and biological 
kinds constitute psychological kinds (persons) with greater causal powers under certain 
circumstances.  So Bakers position has the following features: 
 
a. When a simpler kind constitutes a more complex kind, there is more than one 
distinct object occupying the same space at the same time.  So, the combinations 
of chemicals that constitute the organism and the organism that constitute the 
person are distinct objects occupying the same space at the same time. 
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b. When a simpler kind constitutes a more complex kind, the simpler kind does not 
acquire the property of being the complex kind.  So, when the combinations of 
chemicals constitute an organism, the combination of chemicals does not acquire 
the property of being the organism, and when the organism constitutes the person, 
the organism does not acquire the property of being a person. 
c. When a simpler kind constitutes a more complex kind, the simpler kind does not 
cause the complex kind to exist.  So, when the combinations of chemicals 
constitute an organism, the combination of chemicals does not cause the organism 
to exist, and when the organism constitutes the person, the organism does not 
cause the person to exist. 
d. When a simpler kind constitutes a more complex kind, the complex kind has more 
ontological significance and hence greater causal powers than the simpler kind.  
So, the combination of chemicals has less ontological significance and less causal 
power than the organism it constitutes, and the organism has less ontological 
significance and less causal power than the person it constitutes.8 
 
My position rejects (a) and (b), accepts (c) outright and accepts (d) with qualifications.  I 
reject (a) because a person refers to an organism configured in certain ways under certain 
suitable circumstances with certain psychological dispositions and qualities, and an 
organism refers to the combination of chemicals having certain configuration under 
certain suitable circumstances with certain biological dispositions and qualities.  A person 
                                                
8 Baker did not specify what she means by complex kinds having more ontological significance and causal 
powers than simple kinds.  Perhaps she means that an organism can perform higher functions that are 
denied to chemicals constituting it, and that a person can perform higher functions that are denied to 
organisms constituting him/her. 
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and its constitutionally related organism and combination of chemicals do not refer to 
separate and independent primary kinds or material objects.  Rather, the combination of 
chemicals constitutes but is not identical to the organism, and the organism constitutes 
but is not identical to the person.  Persons are just ways organisms arranged in certain 
manners with certain properties are, and organisms are just ways particular combinations 
of chemicals arranged in certain manners with certain properties are.  Hence, it is not the 
case that there is more than one distinct object occupying the same space at the same 
time.  I reject (b) because a person has certain psychological properties (dispositions & 
qualities) when the organism that constitutes it is configured in a certain way and an 
organism similarly has certain biological properties when the chemical components that 
constitute it are configured in certain ways.  Hence, material parts constitute material 
objects by having certain properties when they are arranged in certain ways.  I accept (c) 
because it is not the case that the organism causes the person.  Rather, the causal power 
of the organism is part of (or constitutes) the causal power of the person.  The causal 
power of the person comprises of the organism (biological parts), its configuration (as a 
human being), and its dispositions and qualities (psychological properties).  But how is 
the person more ontologically significant and causally powerful than the organism that 
constitutes it?  It is not that the person as a thing of a primary kind has more ontological 
significance and causally powerful than a thing of another primary kind, the organism, 
that constitutes it.  Rather, I accept (d) because the person refers to its constituent 
biological parts together with its structural configuration and psychological properties 
(and hence encompasses more than just its biological parts).  And the organism only 
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refers to its constituent chemical parts with its structural configuration and biological 
properties (and hence encompasses more than just its chemical parts). 
 
The notion of constitution as mereological relation without identity and its implication for 
the mind-body problem can be clarified by the following illustration.  Consider how the 
below items belonging to the same person are related to each other: 
 
Sub-atomic Particles ! Atoms ! Molecules ! Cells ! Tissues ! Organs ! Systems 
! Person 
 
The first thing to say about relationship of the items is this: items on the left constitute the 
items on their right.  The constitution thesis I accept has the following characteristics, 
which can be expressed through the example 
 
• Mereological relation  items on the left are parts of the items on their right.  
Assuming that the items constitute the same person, they are described by the 
acceptance of points (1) to (4) above.  That is, (1) the constituting items on the left 
and the constituted items on the right occupy the same space at the same time; (2) 
what affects the constituting items on the left affects the constituted items on the 
right and vice versa; (3) the constituting items on the left and the constituted items 
on the right share the same parts, and (4) the constituting items on the left and the 
constituted items on the right count as one thing.  It is not that items on the right 
are objects of certain primary kinds distinct from items on the left.  Rather, the 
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constituting items on the left that make up the constituted items on the right are 
one object occupying the same space at the same time.  Where items on the left 
refer to the constituting parts in certain configurations, items on the right refer to 
the constituted whole and their relational properties. 
• Non-identity relation  items on the left are not identical to the items on their 
right.  Assuming that the items constitute the same person, they are described by 
the rejection of points (5) to (8) above.  That is, (5) items on the right exist when 
items on the left exist.  (5) is false because it is possible for items on the left to 
exist without constituting items on their right; (6) items on the right is nothing 
more than items on the left.  (6) is false because items on the right are constituted 
by items on their left when they are configured in certain ways with certain 
dispositions and qualities, and hence items on the right encompass more than 
items on their left; (7) items on the right are not distinct from the items on their 
right.  (7) is false because of the same reason as (6); (8) items on the right are 
fully described by items on their left.  (8) is false because items on the right 
encompass items on their left plus their configurations, dispositions and qualities.  
So, items on the left cannot be complete descriptions of items on their right. 
• Non-causal relation - items on the left do not cause the items on their right (in the 
efficient sense).  Rather, the causal power of the items on the left is part of (or 
constitutes) the causal power of the items on the right.  It is not that items on the 
right have independent and distinct causal powers on their own, but that the causal 
powers of items on the right comprise of the items on their left as parts, their 
configuration and their dispositions and qualities. 
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In contrast with Baker, my idea of constitution is this: when parts (xs = piece of clay = 
Lumpl) have certain structural configuration under certain circumstances, a whole (fusion 
of xs = statue = Goliath) have certain relational properties (dispositions and qualities) that 
is not identical with or reducible to its material parts and structural configuration alone.    
The causal powers of the whole and its relational properties are determined by, fixed by 
or dependent on, but not possessed by, identical with, or reducible to its parts or structural 
configuration. And the whole and its relational properties are not caused by its parts or 
structural configuration.  Similarly in the person-body relation: when a certain 
combination of chemicals with a certain structural configuration in a certain environment 
is instantiated, an organism with new dispositions and qualities is instantiated, and when 
an organism in a certain structural configuration in a certain environment is instantiated, a 
person with new dispositions and qualities is instantiated.  I agree with Baker that 
constitution makes an ontological difference in another sense, that the constituted object 
is more than the sum of its non-overlapping constituting parts because its structural 
configuration and relational properties (ways objects are) do figure in ontology, even 
when the object decomposes exhaustively into its non-overlapping parts.  In terms of the 
mind-body relation, the body refers to material parts and their structural configuration, 
the mind refers to the relational properties (dispositions and qualities), and the person 
refers to the material object as a whole.  Applying these notions back to Gibbards 
example, body refers to Lumpl, mind refers to the aesthetic properties of a statue, and 
person refers to Goliath.  This completes my solution to the problem of material 





In this chapter, I have first argued that the constitution is identity solutions either offer 
inadequate accounts of qualitative differences or if they did, the notion of identity (as we 
understand it) is significantly compromised.  Second, I have argued that the constitution 
is not identity solution cannot avoid the possibility of having more than one object 
occupying the same place at the same time.  Third, I have proposed the constitution as 
mereological relation without identity solution both to offer an adequate account of 
qualitative differences and to avoid the possibility of having more than one object 
occupying the same place at the same time.  Lastly, I have applied this solution as a 
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Emergence is a key conceptual component of non-reductive physicalism.  It is the idea 
that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, ontologically or epistemologically.  I 
would first examine the central assumptions of emergence: the layered model of reality 
and levels of complexity.  This is followed by a discussion of the central features of 
emergence and the twin difficulties of configurational forces and downward causation it 
generated.  Next, I will argue that the idea of emergence can be conserved without 
accepting the problematic configurational forces and downward causation.  And I would 
conclude this chapter by examining how this refined idea of emergence can help shed 
light on the mind-body problem.  
 
The Central Assumptions of Emergence: The Layered Model of Reality and Levels 
of Complexity 
 
Jaegwon Kim, in his article The Layered Model: Metaphysical Considerations, 
mentions one central assumption of emergentism, namely that entities and properties of 
the world are structured in a hierarchy of levels, starting from the micro-particles at the 
fundamental physical level, to the molecules at the chemical level, then to the cells, 
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tissues, organs and organic systems at the biological level, and finally to the conscious 
phenomenon of the psychological level and the cultural phenomenon at the social level 
(ontological distinctions).  Corresponding to this layered model of entities and properties 
of the world is an ordering of the sciences addressing them, with physics as the basic 
science at the fundamental level, followed by the special sciences like chemistry, 
biology, psychology, and sociology at an increasingly higher level (epistemological 
distinctions). 
 
Kim further explicates the layered model by quoting C. Lloyd Morgans Emergent 
Evolution,  
 
Let there by three successive levels of natural events A, B, and C.  Let there be in B a 
kind of relation which is not present in A; and in C a kind of relation, not yet present in B 
or in A.  (Morgan 1923, P.5-6) 
 
For Kim, A, B, and C are seen as properties and kinds rather than natural events on 
different levels of emergence.  These are levels of emergence where level A is the lowest 
and most fundamental, level B emerges from A with novel properties not deducible or 
predictable from knowledge of entities at A, and level C then emerges from B with novel 
properties not deducible or predictable from knowledge of entities at A and B.  Morgan 
believes that levels A, B and C correspond to Matter, Life, and Mind respectively in 
ascending grades within a pyramidal scheme, with matter forming the base, life in the 
middle and mind near its apex.  Each and every entity in the world belongs to one unique 
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level in this scheme but Morgan was well aware that levels represented in the scheme are 
not exhaustive and intermediate levels can be added indefinitely.  With an aim to present 
a comprehensive ontology of the entire natural order, Morgans scheme, from the lowest 
to the highest level would include the following levels: Atoms, Molecules, Plants, 
Animals, and Human Beings.  The pyramidal structure of the scheme does suggests that 
entities at the highest level C is only a fraction of the mid-level entities at level B, which 
are in turn only a fraction of lower level entities at level A.    
 
On the distinction between higher and lower levels, Morgan has this to say: 
 
But we must now ask: Higher in what sense? When two or more kinds of events such 
as I spoke of before as A, B and C, co-exist on one complex system in such wise that C 
kind involves the co-existence of B, and B in like manner involves A, whereas the A-kind 
does not involve the co-existence of B, nor B that of C, we may speak of C, as, in this 
sense, higher than B, and B than A.  Thus, for emergent evolution, conscious events at 
level C (mind) involve specific physiological events at level B (life), and these involve 
specific physico-chemical events at level A (matter).  No mind without life, and no life 
without a physical basis. (Morgan 1923, P.15) 
 
Again, Kim observed that Morgans A, B, and C refer to properties and kinds rather than 
individual entities.  And the passage can be read as saying that C (mind) is higher than B 
(life) because C (mind) can only exists if certain configurations of B (life) is present, and 
that B (life) is higher than A (matter) because B (life) can only exists if certain 
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configurations of A (matter) is present.  The converse is not true.  Kim pointed out a 
problem with Morgans view.  It concerns the conjunctive closure principle.  According 
to the conjunctive closure principle, if P and Q are both biological properties at level B, 
so is their conjunction P&Q.  This principle no longer allows psychological properties at 
level C to be higher than biological properties at level B.  Kim further adds that the 
conjunctive closure principle is highly plausible for any natural family of properties. 
 
To be consistent, this principle must be applicable to a lower level.  So if P and Q are 
both physicochemical properties at level A, so is their conjunction P&Q.  This principle 
no longer allows biological properties at level B to be higher than physicochemical 
properties at level A.  That is, special configurations of A (matter) are both necessary and 
sufficient for the instantiation of B (life).  If the relationship between A, B and C are 
transitive, then this principle would affirm that physicochemical properties at level A are 
both necessary and sufficient for the instantiation of psychological properties at level C, 
and it no longer allow psychological properties at level C to be higher than 
physicochemical properties at level A.  So if the conjunctive closure principle is correct, 
then levels B and C can be reduced to level A (configurations of physicochemical 
properties) and nothing else.  Given the presence of biological features at level B not 
adequately accounted for at level A and the presence of psychological features at level C 
not adequately accounted for at levels B and A, accepting the conjunctive closure 
principle would amount to committing the fallacy of composition for the emergentists. 
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Hence, emergentists would want to deny the conjunctive closure principle.  They would 
agree that A is necessary for B and B is necessary for C but not that A is sufficient for 
B and B is sufficient for C.  This is because this principle does not allow the emergentist 
to account for the non-deducible and unpredictable novel properties at the higher level 
that the special configurations at the lower level instantiates.  Special configurations at 
the lower level do include properties and their relations but it may not account for the 
features at the higher level.  Physicochemical configurations at level A may be necessary 
but not sufficient for the biological dispositions and qualities at level B.  By the same 
token, biological configurations at level B may be necessary but not sufficient for 
psychological dispositions and qualities at level C.  For example, the physiochemical 
alone does not account for the function of a circulatory system and the biological alone 
does not account for the feature of intentional content.  The conjunctive closure principle, 
then, is not compatible with the emergentist outlook. 
 
Acceptance of the conjunctive closure principle leads Kim to propose the relationship 
between A, B, and C as one of supervenience.  That is, C is higher than B, because C is 
dependent on and determined by B, and B is higher than A, because B is dependent on 
and determined by A.  The converse is not true.  Kim believes that emergentists accept 
the thesis that emergent properties supervene on the basal conditions from which it 
supervenes.  And he does not believe that emergentists would claim that given the same 
set of basal conditions, the emergent properties could have been different.  Kim then 
introduced the notion of transitivity into the supervenient relationship.  If C (mind) 
supervenes on B (life) and that B (life) supervenes on A (matter), then it follows that C 
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(mind) supervenes on A (matter). Assuming that supervenience describes Morgans idea 
of the relationship between A, B and C correctly, there is no problem with this view. 
 
According to Kim, Morgans notion of higher and lower does not seem to be quite right.  
Commenting on Morgans five-fold schema, Kim pointed out that Morgan would want 
human beings to rank higher than animals and animals to rank higher than plants.  Given 
that the relationship between higher and lower is defined by supervenience, we cannot 
say that human beings supervene on animals and animals supervene on plants.  And 
given the transitivity of supervenience, it follows that human beings does not supervene 
on plants.  There are two ways out of this problem.  First, higher and lower levels do not 
have to be understood in terms of supervenience.  Second, Morgan can stick the threefold 
schema of A (matter), B (life), C (mind) and give up the fivefold schema of atoms, 
molecules, plants, animals, and human beings.  Again, assuming that supervenience 
describes Morgans idea of the relationship between A, B and C correctly, we can adopt 
the second way out and insist that there is no problem for Morgans understanding of 
higher and lower in terms of supervenience. 
 
Morgan said that there is no mind without life or that mind supervenes on life.  Kim 
raised a problem for this view by stating the possibility of non-biological systems with 
psychological properties.  I take psychological properties here to mean both cognitive and 
phenomenal properties.  If it is possible for electro-mechanical robots to think (and 
perhaps even feel) like human beings do, then it is no longer true that there is no mind 
without life or that mind supervenes on life.  The layered model breaks down as we can 
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have C (mind) directly dependent on or determined by A (matter) and bypassing B (life).  
In other words, C (mind) no longer supervenes on B (life) or requires B (life) as a 
necessary condition, that role is performed solely by A (matter).  One way out of this 
problem is to admit the possibility of non-biological systems with psychological 
properties and limit the layered model to organisms only.  Even though the applicability 
of the layered model has been reduced, it can still shed light on the structure of 
organisms.  And we do not need to dispense off the layered model altogether. 
 
On the notion of complexity as the distinctive feature between the higher and lower 
levels, Kim quoted Morgans following passage: 
 
Each higher entity in the ascending series is an emergent complex of many entities of 
lower grades, within which a new kind of relatedness gives integral unity. (Morgan 
1923, P.13) 
 
Kim takes Morgan to mean that a higher entity is a composite thing made up of lower 
entities.  In this context, it means that C (mind) is a higher entity composed of lower 
entity B (life), and B (life) is a higher entity composed of a still lower entity A 
(matter).  C (mind) is seen as a new kind of relatedness based on a certain organisation 
and structuring of B (life), and B (life) is seen as a new kind of relatedness based on a 
certain organisation and structuring of A (matter).  This seems to be what Morgan means 
by integral unity.  With the use of two examples, Kim suggests that such notions of 
higher and lower are not sufficient.  First, he pointed out that a slab of marble is a higher 
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entity than smaller marble parts that make it up makes no useful sense.  Second, he uses 
Ned Blocks Chinese nation example to show that it is possible for the whole could be 
lower than the parts of which it is composed; namely that the Chinese nation possess 
no consciousness but the Chinese individuals which composes the Chinese nation do. 
 
Kims criticisms on the insufficiencies of the higher and lower notions can be answered 
in the following manner.  The first example can be seen as being on the same level (level 
of matter).  That could be why it makes no useful sense.  However, if we divide the 
physical (atomic) and the chemical (molecular) into two different levels, it seems to make 
some useful sense.  We can then say that chemical (molecular) entity of a slab of marble 
is a new kind of relatedness based on certain organisation and structuring of physical 
(atomic) entities.  The second example is more problematic.  The questions of what 
consciousness really is and what or who is said to possess it are still contentious.  If we 
assume that the Chinese individuals possess consciousness, then the Chinese nation is a 
new kind of relatedness based on a certain organisation and structuring of psychological 
entities (Chinese persons).  This is a fact allowable by emergentism.  All we need is to 
include a new higher level of Society, say level D.  And we can conceive D (society) as a 
new kind of relatedness based on a certain organisation and structuring of Cs (persons). 
 
Perhaps a qualification here helps further discussion.  In organisms, all Cs (psychological 
properties) are new kinds of relatedness based on certain complex organisation and 
structuring of Bs (biological properties) but the converse is not true.  And in organisms, 
all Bs (biological properties) are new kinds of relatedness based on certain complex 
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organisation and structuring of As (physicochemical properties) but the converse is not 
true.  This allows for complex biological properties without psychological properties, 
complex physicochemical properties without biological properties, and even for entities 
with psychological properties without biological properties; thus making room for a more 
flexible layered model of reality.  What I want to do here is to preserve the usefulness of 
the layered model of reality when compared to a mere mereological (part/whole) relation, 
especially when applied to organisms.  One can see that the psychological is constituted 
by the biochemical and the biochemical by the atomic in the layered model. 
 
Finally, Kim commented on Morgans idea that the higher entity must be an emergent 
complex of entities at lower levels, and this means that there is some additional property 
possessed by the higher entity (the whole) that is not possessed by the lower entities (the 
parts) that composed it.  In other words, C (mind) is a higher property than B (life) just in 
case C (mind) emerges from B (life) and B (life) is a higher property than A (matter) just 
case B (life) emerges from A (matter).  Kim says that such an idea requires a prior 
understanding of emergence, and if emergentism is false and there are no emergent 
properties, the layered model of reality cannot even get started.  The onus now is on the 
emergentists to make sense of emergent properties and I will explore this in detail next. 
 
The Central Features of Emergence 
 
Robert Van Gulik, in his article Reduction & Emergence: A Philosophical Review, 
made a distinction between metaphysical and epistemological emergence by specifying 
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the sort of factors that figure in emergence relations.  Metaphysical emergence refers to 
relations among basal and emergent real world items.  This includes relations among 
entities, properties, processes and events.  Epistemological emergence refers to cognitive 
explanatory relations about basal and emergent real world items.  This includes relations 
between concepts, theories, models and frameworks.  After we clarified the sort of factors 
that figure in emergent relations, we need to find out the central features of emergent 
factors, whether they are of the metaphysical variety  entities, properties, processes and 
events, or of the epistemological variety  concepts, theories, models and frameworks.9  
We can approach the central features of emergentism by appealing to the central concepts 
used by the British emergentists. 
 
Heteropathic and Homeopathic Laws/Effects 
 
By contrasting the terms heteropathic laws/effects and homeopathic laws/effects in the 
writings of John Stuart Mill, we can derive the first central feature of emergent 
properties.  In a passage from A System of Logic, he states: 
 
All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing inorganic 
nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena 
of life, which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no 
analogy to any of the effects which would be produced by the action of the component 
                                                
9 There is another distinction between strong and weak emergence.  Strong emergence affirms that wholes 
have active downward causal powers over their parts.  Weak emergence denies that wholes have active 
causal powers over the parts, but affirms that wholes have passive causal powers (in the form of constrains) 
over its parts.  This discussion will only make reference to the metaphysical /epistemological distinction. 
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substances considered to be mere physical agents.  To whatever we might imagine our 
knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients of a living body to be extended or 
perfected, it is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions. (Mill 1843, 
Bk.3, Ch.6, P.1) 
 
Mill make use of the contrast between homeopathic and heteropathic laws and effects to 
explain conjoint causal actions on mechanical phenomena and chemical phenomena 
respectively.  For mechanical phenomena, the total effect of several causes conjoint is 
identical to the sum of effects of each cause working individually.  The total effect of two 
forces F and G acting conjointly on a particle X is equal to the effect of F acting on X 
plus the effect of G acting on X.  Mill names the causal component as composition of 
causes and the effect component as homeopathic effects.  And he names the law 
governing the relations between these causes and effects homeopathic laws.  The laws 
of vector additions are examples of such laws.  For chemical phenomena, the total effect 
of several causes conjoint is not identical to the sum of effects of each cause working 
individually.  Here, the total effect of two forces F and G acting conjointly on particle X 
is not equal to the effect of F acting on X plus the effect of G acting on X.  Mill names 
this effect, which violates the composition of causes, heteropathic effects and names 
the corresponding laws governing these causal relations heteropathic laws.  The 
chemical example Mill used is that Sodium hydroxide + hydrochloric acid produces 
sodium chloride + water (NaOH + HCI → NACl + H2O).  In this chemical reaction, the 
product of water and salt is not identical or equal to the sum of the effects of the 
individual reactants, an acid and a base.  Mill believes that these heteropathic laws and 
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effects apply to both biological and psychological phenomena as well while supposing 
that it is conceivable to reduce psychology to biology. 
 
On the interaction between homeopathic and heteropathic laws, Mill writes: 
 
Those bodies continue, as before, to obey mechanical and chemical laws, in so far as 
the operation of those laws is not counteracted by the new laws which govern them as 
organised beings. (Mill 1843, P.431)  
 
Mill is saying that higher-level heteropathic laws do not supplant the lower-level 
homeopathic laws but supplement them.  For example, Newtons second law, F=ma, does 
not state that that only physical forces count.  If chemical or biological (or even 
psychological) forces exist, they will be summed with whatever physical forces are 
already present, and that will be the value of F in the equation. 
 
Trans-ordinal and Intra-ordinal Laws 
 
The second central feature of emergent properties can be derived from contrasting the 
concepts of trans-ordinal and intra-ordinal laws as advocated by C.D. Broad in his book 
The Mind and its Place in Nature.  He was addressing the question of whether the special 
sciences (psychology and social sciences) are reducible to the general sciences (chemistry 
and biology), and ultimately to the basic science (physics).    Broad suggested two 
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answers to the reducibility problem  mechanical and emergent.  The purest mechanical 
answer is spelt out as follows: 
 
There is one and only one kind of material.  Each particle of these obeys one elementary 
law of behaviour, and continues to do so no matter how complex may be the collection of 
particles of which it is a constituent.  There is one uniform law of composition, 
connecting the behaviour of group of these particles as wholes with the behaviour which 
each would show in isolation and with the structure of the group.  All the apparently 
different kinds of stuff are just differently arranged groups of different numbers of the one 
kind of elementary particle; and all the apparently peculiar laws of behaviour are simply 
special cases which could be deduced in theory from the structure of the whole under 
consideration, the elementary law of behaviour for isolated particles, and the one 
universal law of composition.  On such a view, the external world has the greatest 
amount of unity which is conceivable.  There is really one science, and the various 
special sciences are just particular cases of it. (Broad 1925, P.76) 
 
Broad rejected this mechanical answer for an emergent one.  While he would agree that 
there is only one kind of fundamental stuff (substance monism), he would recognise 
aggregate matter of different orders or levels (layered model of reality).  Each level is 
characterised by certain fundamental and irreducible properties that emerged from the 
lower levels.  There are two types of laws: (1) intra-ordinal laws, which relate properties 
within a level and (2) trans-ordinal laws, which characterise the emergence of higher-
level properties from lower ones.  Emergent properties figure in the consequent of at least 
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one trans-ordinal law, with lower level properties figuring in the antecedent.  Broad 
illustrates: 
 
A trans-ordinal law would be one which connects the properties of aggregates of 
adjacent orders.  A and B would be adjacent, and in ascending order, if every aggregate 
of order B is composed of aggregate order A, and if it has certain properties which no 
aggregate of order A possesses and which cannot be deduced from the A-properties and 
the structure of the B-complex by any law of composition which has manifested itself at 
lower levelsA trans-ordinal law would be a statement of the irreducible fact that an 
aggregate composed of aggregates of the next lower order in such and such proportions 
and arrangements has such and such characteristic and non-deducible properties. 
(Broad 1925, P.77-78) 
 
Trans-ordinal laws are fundamental and irreducible laws that describe a synchronic, non-
causal co-variation of a higher-level emergent property and its lower-level base property.  
Any lower-level laws do not metaphysically necessitate them.  Broad has this to say 
about the epistemological feature of trans-ordinal laws: 
 
There is nothing, so far as I can see, mysterious or unscientific about a trans-ordinal 
law or about the notion of ultimate characteristics of a given order.  A trans-ordinal law 
is as good as any other; and, once it has been discovered, it can be used like any other to 
suggest experiments, to make predictions, and to give us practical control over external 
objects.  The only peculiarity of it is that we must wait till we meet with an actual 
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instance of an object of the higher order before we can discover such a law; and that we 
cannot possibly deduce it beforehand from any combination of laws which we have 
discovered by observing aggregates of the lower order. (Broad 1925, P.79) 
 
This is the idea that an ideal theorist (what Broad would call a mathematical archangel), 
with complete knowledge of aggregates, properties and their relations at a lower-level, 
would be unable to predict or deduce what might emerge from a specific lower-level 
structure with certain aggregates and properties prior to observing the actual instantiation 
of a complex higher-level event. 
 
Emergent and Resultant Properties 
 
Through contrasting the terms emergent and resultant in the writings of C. Lloyd 
Morgan, we arrive at the third central feature of emergent properties.  In a passage from 
Emergent Evolution, he says: 
 
The essential feature of a mechanical  or, if it be preferred, a mechanistic  
interpretation is that it is in terms of resultant effects only, calculable by algebraic 
summation.  It ignores the something more that must be accepted as emergentagainst 
such a mechanical interpretation  such mechanistic dogma  emergent revolution rises 
in protest.  The gist of its contention is that such an interpretation is quite inadequate.  
Resultants there are; but there is emergence also.  Under naturalistic treatment, 
however, the emergence, in all its ascending grades, is loyally accepted, on the evidence, 
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with natural piety.  That it cannot be mechanically interpreted in terms of resultants only, 
is just that for which it is our aim to contend with reiterated emphasis (Morgan 1923, 
P.8) 
 
In his article The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism, Brian McLaughlin highlighted 
the examples used by Morgan to distinguish between emergents and resultants: 
 
When carbon having certain properties combines with sulphur having other properties 
there is formed, not a mere mixture but a new compound, some of the properties of which 
are quite different from those of either component (Morgan 1923, P.3) 
 
The new compound here refers to an emergent.  Morgan contrasts this with another 
example involving only a resultant: 
 
The weight of the compound is an additive resultant, the sum of the weights of the 
components. (Morgan 1923, P.3) 
 
McLaughlin noted that Morgan is arguing that, through a process of evolution, new and 
unpredictable complex phenomena emerge.  He rejects both Cartesian dualism (which 
accepts the existence of mental substances) and Bergsonian vitalism (which accepts the 
existence of entelechies and élan vital).  According to Morgan, every substance is or is 
wholly composed of elementary material particles, some of which became increasingly 
complex in the course of Darwinian evolution, and eventually developed emergent 
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properties.  As mentioned earlier, the various emergent levels in the ascending grades of 
complexity are the subject matter of the various special sciences.  These various grades of 
complexity have their own laws.  Morgan believes that such laws at the higher level are 
effective and they make a difference to the go of events at the lower level.  The 
higher-level laws involve lower-level laws but are not wholly dependent on or 
determined by them.  And finally, the less complex lower-level laws do not anticipate the 
more complex higher-level laws. 
 
In his Space, Time and Deity, Samuel Alexander states that the activity of a living human 
being consists in a single process whose fundamental qualities are physicochemical: 
 
Physical and chemical processes of a certain complexity have the quality of life.  The 
new quality emerges with this constellation of such processes, and therefore life is at 
once a physiochemical complex and is not merely physical and chemical, for these terms 
do not sufficiently characterise the new complex which in the course and order of time 
has been generated out of them.  The higher quality emerges from the lower level of 
existence and its roots therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to that 
lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of 
behaviour.  The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted, 
as some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to 
say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the natural piety of the investigator.  It 
admits no explanation. (Alexander 1920, P.46-7) 
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Apply this idea of emergent quality to mental phenomena, Alexander says: 
 
We are forced, therefore, to go beyond the mere correlation of the mental with these 
neural processes and to identify them.  There is but one process which, being of a specific 
complexity, has the quality of consciousness (Alexander 1920, Vol.2, P.5) 
 
Here, Alexander could be read as saying that there are additional (emergent) biological 
and psychological properties, which generate configurational forces supplementing the 
physicochemical (base) properties and forces.  This reading, however, does not seem to 
be consistent with what Alexander says in the following passage: 
 
The emergent quality and the constellation to which it belongs are at once new and 
expressible without residue in terms of the processes proper to the level from which they 
emerge (Alexander 1920, P.67) 
 
Timothy OConnor and Hong Yu Wong, in their article Emergent Properties, 
commented that Alexanders emergent quality of life simply sums up a number of 
interconnected features such as self-regulation, reproduction, and plasticity of 
behavioural response.  This new emergent quality is just a short hand for a complex set of 
features.  Alexanders emergent terms like life or mind are best read as primitive 
features associated with organised structures.  Following this, OConnor and Hong argue 
that Alexanders view does not involve configurational forces as it allows a LaPlacian 
calculator of unlimited computational ability who knew only the basic principles of 
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physics and the state of the universe at a pre-organic stage might predict the subsequent 
distribution of all matter in physical terms.  Still, the LaPlacian calculator could not 
predict the emergent qualities and processes of living and minded systems.  Moreover, 
these emergent properties are not epiphenomenal; they are causally relevant to physical 
and chemical systems.  OConnor and Hong then summarised Alexanders view as 
follows: emergent properties are novel qualities that supervene on a distinctive kind of 
physicochemical process.    They have their own form of behaviour and yet are fully 
consistent with the causal completeness of physics and chemistry.  Owing to 
supervenience, they pass a counterfactual test for causal efficacy  a given neural process 
would not possess its specific neural character if it were not also mental.  While the 
mental qualities cause mental effects and the underlying neural qualities have neural 
effects can be seen as one process having both kinds of qualities, there is also a sense in 
which the mental state causes a subsequent neural state. 
 
As we have seen, a cluster of related concepts like heteropathic laws, trans-ordinal laws, 
emergents, and their unpredictability and non-deducibility from homeopathic laws, intra-
ordinal laws and resultants, define the central features of emergentism.  OConnor and 
Hong identified two strands of emergentism, one represented by Mill, Broad and Morgan, 
another by Alexander.  For Mill, Broad and Morgan, emergence involves the appearance 
of high-level causal interactions that are additional to those of the more fundamental 
entities and principles.  Though these interactions are composed of fundamental 
properties and relations between them, they are said to have primitive causal powers 
which connect the complex physical structures to the emergent qualities.  For Alexander, 
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emergence involves the appearance of high-level causal patterns which cannot be directly 
expressed in terms of the more fundamental entities and principles.  These patterns do not 
supplement or supersede the fundamental entities and principles; they are macroscopic 
patterns running through those microscopic interactions.  Though emergent qualities are 
new, the worlds fundamental properties and processes remain unchanged.  Put simply, 
the former is ontological emergence and the latter is epistemological emergence.  This 
distinction is not always that clear cut.  Conceived this way, emergence, especially the 
ontological version held by Mill, Broad and Morgan, is committed to configurational 
forces and downward causation which philosophers committed to physicalism find 
problematic.  This is what I will look into next. 
 




Brian McLaughlin gave a comprehensive discussion of configurational forces in his 
article The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism.  He defines configurational forces as 
fundamental forces that can be exerted only by certain types of configurations of 
particles, and not by any types of pairs of particles.  This is contrasted with the basic, 
non-configurational particle pair forces that can be exerted by pairs of elementary 
particles.  He explains how configurational forces can interact with (mechanical) force 
laws the like law of gravity.  When two objects have mass and are charged, the resultant 
of the force due to gravity and force due to electricity is derived from vector addition.  
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This resultant vector sum is the total force exerted on an object.  Special (chemical, 
biological, psychological) laws that specify configurational forces can be easily 
accommodated into mechanical laws.  If these configuration forces are present, they are 
simply vector added to figure in the total force exerted on an object, as discussed under 
heteropathic laws above. 
 
There is no conflict between configurational forces and Newtons mechanical laws of 
motion.  The first general law of motion states that every object remains at rest or 
remains in straight uniform motion unless acted upon by net external forces.  The second 
general force of motion, F=ma, states that the net force on an object equals its inertia 
mass multiplied by its acceleration.  The third general law of motion states that for every 
action there is an equal and opposite reaction; momentum is conserved.  When two 
bodies exert a force on each other, their momenta (inertia mass multiplied by 
acceleration) will be equal in opposite directions.  Note that the three laws of motion tell 
us how objects will behave if external forces are exerted on them but they do not tell us 
what external forces there are.  Hence, configurational forces can figure in the net forces 
under the general laws of motion.  
 
There is no conflict between configurational forces and the principles of conservation.  
First, configurational forces need not violate the principle of conservation of mass.  The 
mass of a configuration of particles exerting a configurational force could be the sum of 
the masses of the constituents of the configuration.  Second, configurational forces need 
not violate the principle of conservation of energy.  Configurations of particles exerting 
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configurational forces have the capacity to do work that could not be anticipated just by 
particles in isolation and their spatial arrangements but it is possible for particles to 
contain certain kind of potential energy (micro-latent) that can be released only when the 
particle figures in an appropriate configuration.  The total amount of energy remains 
constant despite configurational forces.    Third, configurational forces need not violate 
the principle of conservation in the theory of relativity, E=mc².  When chemical bonding 
takes place, there is a slight increase in their masses.  And when compounds break apart, 
there is a slight decrease in their masses.  Configurational forces could involve various 
compensating shifts in mass and energy that comply with the principle of conservation of 
mass-energy.  Hence, configurational forces are compatible with all the principles of 
conservation. 
 
Though McLaughlin agrees that there are heteropathic effects, trans-ordinal effects and 
emergents, he argues that quantum mechanics and the various scientific advances have 
shown that there is no empirical evidence for configurational forces.  It is not that 
Emergentism is logically incompatible with quantum mechanics; McLaughlin agrees that 
it is.  The problem rather, is empirical.  Quantum mechanical explanations of chemical 
bonding in terms of electro-magnetism and the advances they made in the field of 
molecular biology and genetics, in particular the discovery of DNA, have made 
emergentists idea of configurational (chemical, biological, psychological) forces with 
causal powers highly implausible.  In his article Reduction, Emergence and 
Explanation, Michael Silberstein presented a series of evidence for the irreducibility of 
the chemistry to quantum mechanics.  He cited various authors in saying that 
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contemporary chemists do not use quantum mechanics to do their science; that quantum 
mechanical wave functions are not well-suited to represent chemical systems or support 
key inferences essential to chemistry; that it is still an open question as to whether 
quantum mechanics can describe or represent a molecule; that little of current chemistry 
can be represented by pure quantum mechanical calculations; and that chemistry uses 
idealised models whose relationships to fundamental quantum mechanics is questionable. 
 
Silberstein further argues that quantum mechanics provides examples of emergence by 
quoting T. Maudlins Part and Whole in Quantum Mechanics: 
 
In quantum theory, then, the physical state of a complex whole cannot always be 
reduced to those of its parts, or to those of its parts together with their spatiotemporal 
relations, even when the parts inhabit distinct regions of space.  Modern science and 
modern physics in particular, can hardly be holding reductionism as a central premise, 
given that the result of the most intensive scientific investigations in history is a theory 
that contains an ineliminable holism. (Maudlin 1998, P.55) 
 
Commenting on the passage, Silberstein says that a system in classical physics can be 
analysed into parts, whose states and properties determine those of the whole they 
compose.  Quantum physics resists such analysis.  The quantum state of a system gives a 
specification of its probabilistic dispositions to display various properties on its 
measurement.  The most complete of such specification is known as a pure state.  A 
system as a whole has a pure state but its subsystem component parts may not.  As a 
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result, the whole system is not constituted by the states of its component parts.  This is 
known as the nonseparability or entanglement of the component subsystems.  State 
assignments in quantum mechanics violate state separability in two ways: the subsystems 
may not be assigned states of their own or else the states they are assigned may fail to 
determine the state of the system they compose.  On the basis of nonseparabiliy, some 
authors have argued that quantum mechanics provides us with examples of systems that 
have properties that do not always reduce to their component parts, and that they have 
novel properties of their own, or of subsystems that can become entangled and form a 
new unified system which is not a sum of its component parts.  From this, some authors 
went further and infer that the state of the compound system determines the state of its 
constituents, but not vice versa.  In other words, it is possible to hold, contra McLaughlin, 
that quantum mechanics may have made emergentists idea of configurational (chemical, 
biological, psychological) forces with causal powers highly plausible instead. 
 
The question of whether there are configurational forces is far from settled.  Acceptance 
of configurational forces with causal powers implies downward causation.  And 
acceptance of downward causation means that it is possible for the higher-level entities to 
determine the lower-level entities.  That is, it is possible for the psychological to 
determine the biological, the biological to determine the chemical, and the chemical to 
determine the physical.  Most philosophers committed to physicalism would find this 
unacceptable and argue that it is the lower-level entities that determine the higher-level 






Achim Stephan, in his article Emergence  A Systematic View and its Historical Facets, 
commented on downward causation through Roger Sperrys works.  On the notion that 
the whole (macro-properties) has causal influence on the parts (micro-properties) of a 
system, Sperry says: 
 
What matters is that the movement and fate of the parts from that time onward, once a 
new whole is formed, are thereafter governed by entirely new macro-properties and laws 
that previously did not exist, because they are properties of the new configuration 
Macro-determinism thus begins to be superimposed upon micro-determinism from the 
earliest stages onward and grows by a compounding process into increasing prominence 
as evolution progressesMicro-determinism is retained but is held to be incomplete, 
insufficient.  The properties, forces and laws of micro-events are shown to be 
encompassed and superseded, not disrupted, by the properties, forces, and laws at 
macro-levels. (Sperry 1986, p.267-268) 
 
The key notion here is that micro-deterministic laws are incomplete and it has to be 
completed by macro-deterministic laws.  And this influence of macro-properties (whole) 
on micro-properties (parts) of a system is known as downward causation. 
 
Stephan further identifies four aspects of Sperrys theory: 
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1. The micro-properties of a system (parts and their relations to each other) 
determine completely the emergent macro-properties. 
2. Neither the emergent macro-properties of systems nor the relational properties of 
the parts can be reduced to the non-relational properties of the parts. 
3. The emergent system properties are as holistic properties different from the part 
properties. 
4. The emergent system properties have a causal impact on the parts of the system.  
Besides the micro-determination by the parts we have to consider the macro-
determination of the system. 
 
In explaining the fourth aspect with respect to the relationship between consciousness and 
the brain, Stephan drawn on the following quotes: 
 
The conscious subjective properties in our present view are interpreted to have causal 
potency in regulating the course of brain events; that is, the mental forces or properties 
exert a regulative control influence in brain physiology.  The mental events are causes 
rather than correlates.  In this respect our view can be said to involve a form of mental 
interactionism, except that there is no implication of dualism or parallelism in the 
traditional sense.  The mental forces are direct causal emergents of the brain process. 
(Sperry 1976, P.165) 
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Conscious phenomena as emergent functional properties of brain processing exert an 
active control role as causal determinants in shaping the flow patterns of cerebral 
excitation.  Once generated from neural events, the higher order mental patterns and 
programs have their own subjective qualities and process, operate and interact by their 
own causal laws and principles which are different from and cannot be reduced to those 
of neurophysiologyCompared to the physiological processes, the conscious events are 
more molar, being determined by configurational or organizational interrelations in 
neuronal functions. (Sperry 1980, P201) 
 
Commenting on these passages, Stephan reads Sperry as saying that our conscious mental 
processes, as emergent functional properties, have a causal impact on the base neuronal 
properties that determines the emergent mental phenomena.  And the reasons he gives for 
this reading are that Sperry (i) ascribes conscious phenomena a causal force in shaping 
the flow pattern of neuronal excitation, (ii) characterises mental events as causes rather 
than mere correlates, and (iii) claims that the higher mental patterns and programmes 
interact by their own causal laws which cannot be reduced to the laws of physiology.  I 
would want to add that (iv) conscious phenomena are generated from neural events.  
Sperry calls this non-substantial interactionism.  The problem of downward causation can 
then be stated as the incompatibility between the first (1) and fourth (4) aspects of 
Sperrys theory: How can the micro-properties (neural events) of a system that determine 
completely and be determined by the emergent macro-properties (conscious phenomena) 
at the same time? 
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In Making Sense of Emergence, Jaegwon Kim distinguished between synchronic 
reflexive downward causation and diachronic reflexive downward causation and pointed 
out their difficulties.  Both are reflexive in that a whole causes one of its parts to change 
in a certain way.  The former is synchronic because both the causal events of the whole 
and its parts occur at the same time.  And the latter is diachronic because the causal 
events of the whole and its parts occur at different times.  He describes synchronic 
reflexive downward causation as follows: 
 
At a certain time t, a whole, W, has emergent property M, where M emerges from the 
following configuration of conditions: W has a complete decomposition into parts a1,, 
an; each ai has property Pi; and relation R holds for the sequence a1,, an.  For some 
aj, Ws having M at t causes aj to have Pj at t. (Kim 1999, P.28) 
 
At time t, a whole having emergent property M depends on having certain configurations 
of constituents (a1, an; each ai having some pi) including aj having Pj.  That is, W 
could not have M unless aj has Pj at t.  How can this be consistent with M causes aj to 
have Pj at time t?  M is both dependent on and causes aj having Pj at the same time.  
According to Kim, the source of the problem lies in what he calls the causal-power 
actuality principle, which can be stated as: 
 
For an object x at time t to exercise the causal/determinative powers it has in virtue of 
having property P, x must already possess P at t.  When x is caused to acquire P at t, it 
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does not already possess P at t and is not capable of exercising the causal/determinative 
powers inherent in P. (Kim 1999, P.29) 
 
The assumption that Ws having M at t causes aj to have Pj at t implies, together with the 
causal-power actuality principle, aj does not already possess Pj at t.  By the causal-power 
actuality principle again, aj is not capable of exercising the causal/determinative powers 
inherent in Pj because aj does not possess Pj at t.  This in turn implies that the assumed 
emergence base (aj having Pj) of Ws having M at t is not present and W cannot have M 
at t.  Hence, the notion of synchronic reflexive downward causation is causally circular 
and implausible. 
 
Diachronic reflexive downward causation, as reconstructed from Kims article, can be 
construed as follows: 
 
At a certain time t, a whole, W, has emergent property M, where M emerges from the 
following configuration of conditions: W has a complete decomposition into parts a1, 
an; each ai has property Pi; and relation R holds for the sequence a1, an.  For some aj, 
Ws having M at t causes aj to have Q at t + ∆t. 
 
At time t, a whole having emergent property M depends on having certain configurations 
of constituents (a1, an; each ai having some pi) including aj having Pj.  W could not 
have M unless aj has Pj at t.  But now, M causes aj to have Q at t + ∆t.  There is no 
problem with the causal-power actuality principle because aj already possess Pj at one 
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time and M causes aj to have another property Q at a later time.  Hence, the notion of 
diachronic reflexive downward causation is not causally circular and no longer seems 
implausible. 
 
Kim found that diachronic reflexive downward causation leads to epiphenomenalism.  He 
offers the following argument: If an emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why 
cant P displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M?  Why cant P do all the work in 
explaining why any alleged effect of M occurred?  Assume that in a given system, a 
property M emerges from basal condition P at t and property M* emerges from basal 
condition P* at t + ∆t.  If M at t causes M* at t + ∆t, it must the case that M at t causes 
M*s basal condition, P* at t + ∆t.  But if M emerges from basal condition P, we can say 
that P at t directly causes P*, and hence M* at t + ∆t.  P then pre-empts M as the 
sufficient cause of M*.  M cannot be viewed as causal and hence epiphenomenal.  One 
way to restore the causal power of M is to reduce higher-level property M to its lower-
level base P.  However, Kim noted that this could not be done, as emergent properties are 
by definition not reducible to its lower base.  The paradox here is that higher-level 
properties possess causal powers if they are reducible to lower-level properties, but they 
are no longer higher-level properties if they are so reducible.  Another way to restore 
downward causation is to adopt what Kim calls a conceptual interpretation, where the 
different levels of reality (involve emergent properties with causal powers) become 
different levels of representations or descriptions (does not involve emergent properties 
with causal powers).  In other words, Kim rejects ontological emergence but not 
 101
epistemological emergence.  In what follows, I will explore the possibility of salvaging 
emergence from the twin difficulties of configurational forces and downward causation. 
 
Addressing the Problems of Emergence 
 
Addressing the Problem of Configurational Forces 
 
There may not be any configurational forces (chemical, biological, psychological) but 
this does not imply that there is no configuration.  And the configuration of a system is 
distinct from physical entities that constitute it.  Physical entities, when configured in a 
certain way, behave in a certain way and possess certain qualities.  Emergent properties 
can then be conceived as the behavioural and qualitative features of a system when 
physical entities that constitute it are configured in a certain way.  They no longer need to 
entail any form of configurational forces.  The origin of this idea can be found in John 
Heils book, From an Ontological Point of View, where he defined objects as property-
bearers and properties as ways objects are.  According to Heil, properties are intrinsic to 
objects, and properties contribute to the dispositional and qualitative features of objects.  
In other words, a property is both a disposition and a quality.  One might object here that 
properties may well be dispositions and qualities but they are not emergent.  My reply is 
that objects have the dispositions and qualities they have only when they are configured 
in a certain way.  In a sense, these dispositions and qualities are emergent properties in 
relation to the basal object. 
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To clarify, I am using the term configuration here in two related senses.  In the static 
sense, it refers to the arrangement, organisation and structure of the parts that constitute 
the object.  In the dynamic sense, it refers the processes of connections and interactions 
between the parts that constitute the object.  So when parts are arranged, organised, or 
structured in certain ways (in the static sense), or when parts connect, interact or enter 
into processes with each other in certain ways (in the dynamic sense), then the object 
constituted by these parts bear certain properties.  These properties are at once 
dispositional and qualitative.  The term disposition here refers to function and 
behaviour, and the term quality here refers to phenomenal features of objects.  In sum, 
(1) objects bear properties; (2) properties are ways objects are; and (3) ways objects 
are are at once dispositions and qualities; (4) dispositions and qualities are emergent 
because they are features of objects having certain configurations.  Although Points (1) to 
(4) do not necessarily entail configurational forces; they affirm the distinctions between 
objects, configurations of objects, and properties (both dispositional and qualitative) of 
objects.  Using a chemical example, we can say that water is hydrogen and oxygen 
configured in certain ways that possesses the quality of liquidity under certain conditions 
and the disposition to sustain life on earth.  Here, it is clear that water is not just nothing 
but hydrogen and oxygen, it is rather a certain configuration of hydrogen and oxygen that 
possesses liquidity and sustains life on earth.  Liquidity and sustenance of life are 
properties of water and they are ways water is.  Using a biological example, we can say 
that a DNA strand is a certain configuration of organic molecules that possess the quality 
(shape) of a double helix and the disposition to transmit hereditary traits.  Again, it is 
clear that a DNA strand is not just nothing but organic molecules but rather 
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configurations of organic molecules that possess a double helix shape and transmit 
hereditary traits.  A double helix shape and transmitting hereditary traits are properties of 
DNA; they are ways DNAs are. Being in certain configurations are essential to water 
and DNA but this in no way suggest that they entail configurational forces. 
 
I contend that these distinctions pose little or no problems for philosophers committed to 
physicalism.  There are (1) physical substances and objects, (2) their configurations 
(arrangement, organisation and structure; or connections, interactions and processes), (3) 
their functions and behaviour, and (4) their qualities and appearances.  A very narrow 
view of physicalism would only include the existence of (1) physical substances and 
objects (at the atomic and sub-atomic particles) and nothing much else.  A slightly 
broader form of physicalism would include the existence of (2) configurations 
(arrangement, organisation and structure; or connections, interactions and processes) of 
these physical substances and objects.  In other words, it accepts configurations not as a 
separate entity or force but as something distinct from the mere material makeup of 
substances and objects.  If physicalism is stretched a little broader, it accepts that (3) 
certain configurations (arrangement, organisation and structure; or connections, 
interactions and processes) of physical substances and objects entail certain functional 
and behavioural features.  The most broadly construed physicalism would accept that (4) 
certain configurations (arrangement, organisation and structure; or connections, 
interactions and processes) of physical substances and objects entail certain qualitative 
and phenomenal features.  And these distinctions are equally applicable to the chemical, 
biological and psychological levels.  One crucial question now is the causal status of 
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emergent properties (3) and (4).  Depending on the degree of reduction physicalists find 
acceptable, with the most reductive according causal efficacy only to (1) and the least 
reductive according causal efficacy to all, from (1) to (4).  This leads naturally to further 
discussions on downward causation. 
 
Addressing the Problem of Downward Causation 
 
As we have seen above, the problem of downward causation has two aspects.  The 
problem of synchronic reflexive downward causation is the circular notion that the micro-
properties of a system that determine completely and be determined by the emergent 
macro-properties at the same time.  And the problem of diachronic reflexive downward 
causation is the epiphenomenal status of the macro-properties.  An adequate solution to 
this problem has to address both aspects of the problem. 
 
In his Making Sense of Emergence, Kims reductive solution to the problem involves 
three steps.  First, the emergent property E has to be functionalised, that is, E has to be 
construed as a property defined by its causal / nomic relations to properties in the 
reduction base B.  Second, find the realisers of E in B, that is, find the particular realising 
property P in virtue of which E is instantiated in a given system.  And third, find a theory 
at the level of B that explains how realisers (Ps) of E perform the causal task that is 
constitutive of E.  Such a theory may also explain other causal / nomic relations in which 
E plays a role.  Kim describes three different approaches to this reductive solution.  The 
first defends E as a higher-level property irreducible to its realisers.  As noted by Kim, 
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most functionalists take this position, which sees psychological properties as irreducible 
functional properties defined in terms of input/output correlations, and with biological 
properties as realisers.  The second chooses to identify E with the disjunction of its 
possible realisers (Ps).  The identity relation is nomologically necessary but 
metaphysically contingent.  That is, E has a distinct set of realisers (nomological 
necessity) even though the set of realisers may be different in other possible worlds 
(metaphysical contingency).  The third denies E as a genuine property with causal powers 
and only recognises E as a concept or description.  That is, E only serves to conceptualise 
or describe P in different ways without designating an ontological property.  Though Kim 
did not specify his position here, he seems to prefer the second option.  By identifying E 
(as a function) with a disjunction of possible realisers (Ps), E seems to retain its causal 
status in virtue of P and be conserved at the same time.    The first option would introduce 
an irreducible emergent property, which may be vulnerable to the circular causal problem 
(with synchronic reflexive downward causation) and the causal displacement problem 
(with diachronic reflexive downward causation).  The third option is not susceptible to 
the problems of downward causation but it fails to conserve E by eliminating it. 
 
The central issue here is causal efficacy of emergent properties.  Kim would accept only 
that physical substances and objects, and probably configurations of physical substances 
and objects have causal efficacy.  Realisers can be narrowly defined either as merely 
physical substances and objects, or broadly defined as physical substances and objects 
and their configurations.  The causal efficacy of functions of physical substances and 
objects configured in a certain way is fully determined by and wholly dependent on the 
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basal properties of their realisers.  According to Kim, the causal efficacy of emergent 
properties is conserved as long as they are functionally reduced to or identical with their 
realisers.  He believes that qualities of physical substances and objects configured in a 
certain way have no casual efficacy because they cannot be functionally reduced.  This 
leads to the conclusion that emergent properties that can be functionally reduced are no 
longer emergent and emergent properties that cannot be functionally reduced are 
epiphenomenal.  That is, emergent properties are either not really emergent or they are 
epiphenomenal. 
 
I would like to argue for the position that E is a higher-level property irreducible to its 
realisers and that the causal efficacy of E can be conserved without accepting downward 
causation.  The first step would be accepting Heils notion of properties as ways objects 
are that can be construed as dispositions (functions) and qualities.  On the one hand, 
objects have certain properties (= ways objects are = functions and qualities) when they 
are configured in certain ways.  Properties (=ways objects are = functions and qualities) 
are distinct from objects that bear them and cannot be identical to or reduced to objects 
themselves.  So, realisers (objects) are distinct from the functions or qualities (properties) 
they realise.  On the other hand, these functional and qualitative properties do not refer to 
higher-level ontological entities that possess configurational forces that are capable of 
downward causation.  Rather, they are simply features of objects being configured (= 
arranged = organised = structured; or connects = interact = enter into processes) in certain 
ways.  So realisers are, in a sense, objects which possess certain functions and qualities 
when they are configured in certain ways.  Emergent property E then simply refers to 
 107
these functions and qualities when objects are configured in certain ways.  And when 
certain realisers (objects) in certain configurations are instantiated, certain dispositions 
and qualities (properties) are instantiated at the same time. 
 
The second step would be to conceive objects and properties as a single entity in causal 
relations.  In a causal relation, an object X, which includes parts X, configuration of X, 
disposition of X and quality of X can be conceived as a single cause at some earlier time; 
and an object Y, which includes parts Y, configuration of Y, disposition of Y and quality 
of Y can be conceived as a single effect at some later time.  Using a chemical example, 
when we say water causes salt to dissolve in it, we are saying that an object composed of 
hydrogen and oxygen configured in a certain way that possess the quality of liquidity and 
disposition to dissolve things causes an object composed of sodium and chlorine 
configured in a certain way that possess the quality of solidity and disposition of 
solubility to dissolve in it.  And we do not want to say that hydrogen and oxygen causes 
sodium and chlorine to dissolve in it.  Hence, object and its configuration, disposition and 
quality can count as a single cause and hence are casually efficacious.  We do not need to 
say that only an object and perhaps its configuration are causally efficacious, that its 
disposition is only causally efficacious if it can be reduced to its realising object, and that 
its quality is not causally efficacious at all.10 
 
                                                
10 One may treat qualities as realised dispositions and treat dispositions as unrealised qualities but I would 
like to draw a distinction between dispositional (behavioural and functional) and qualitative (phenomenal) 
properties.  Making this distinction avoids a criticism levelled against behavioural and functionalistic 
theories of mind for admitting only the dispositional aspects and ignoring the qualitative aspects. 
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If the first two steps hold, the third and final step would be to reject both the notions of 
downward and upward causation.  As pointed out by Kim, synchronic reflexive 
downward causation is vulnerable to the circular causal problem and diachronic reflexive 
downward causation is vulnerable to the causal displacement problem.  I would reject 
downward causation to avoid the circular causal problem and reject upward causation to 
avoid the causal displacement problem.  To reject downward causation means to reject 
the notion that the whole (macro-properties) has causal influence on the parts (micro-
properties) of a system.  Using the chemical example, the view that liquidity, the macro-
property of water, is causing its hydrogen and oxygen molecules to dissolve salt by 
means of some configurational forces, should be rejected and be replaced by the second 
step discussed above.  Hydrogen and oxygen molecules when configured in certain ways 
have the feature of (but not causes) liquidity and ability to dissolve things caused salt to 
dissolve in it.  To reject upward causation means to reject the notion that the part (micro-
properties) has causal influence on the whole (macro-properties) of a system.  Using the 
same chemical example, the view that hydrogen and oxygen molecules, the micro-
properties of water, is causing liquidity in water to dissolve salt, should again be rejected 
and replaced by the second step discussed above.  Here, liquidity and the ability to 
dissolve salt are properties of (but not caused by) hydrogen and oxygen molecules 
configured in certain ways.11  The results of this argument are these: 1) the causal 
efficacy of basal properties (objects and its configurations) and emergent properties 
(objects functional and dispositional features) as a system is conserved, 2) both the 
                                                
11 One may argue that psychological properties are too unique and different from chemical or biological 
properties and the analogies are not apt.  My reply would be that chemical and biological properties are 
unique and different in their own ways, and that uniqueness and difference provide no compelling reason to 
suppose that psychological properties warrant a separate and distinct reality apart from the physical world. 
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circular causal problem and causal displacement problem of downward causation are 
avoided, 3) the dilemma that emergent properties are either reducible (and hence not 
emergent anymore) or epiphenomenal is rendered false.12  This argument does not refute 
physicalism but it does refute reductionism.  It is compatible with a broad conception of 
physicalism that admits that there are physical substances and objects, their 
configurations (arrangement, organisation and structure; or connections, interactions and 
processes), their functions and behaviour, as well as their qualities and appearances.  I 
will explore the implications of this view of emergence on the mind-body problem next. 
 
Emergence and its Implication for the Mind-Body Problem 
 
Lets begin with the layered model as a relation between less complex lower-level states 
and more complex high-level states with a few qualifications: (1) the distinction between 
the less complex lower-level states and more complex higher-level states are not always 
clearly defined, they are just approximate representations of reality.  There may not be 
any conceivable highest-level states or lowest-level states; (2) all higher-level states 
entail configurations of lower-level states but not all configurations of lower-level states 
entail higher-level states.  States of varying complexity can be located at the same level 
(e.g. plants and animals); (3) it is possible for higher-level states to be complex 
configurations of much lower-level states (e.g. non-biological beings with psychological 
                                                
12 One may argue that even if the relationship between objects (realisers) and properties (= functions and 
qualities = ways objects are) is synchronic, properties can still be fully dependent on and determined by 
objects and are hence epiphenomenal.  Although I do not deny that possibility, I see objects (realisers) and 
properties (= functions and qualities = ways objects are) as a single cause because when we specify an 
object as a cause, we are in effect specifying its synchronically related  parts, configuration and relational 
properties as a single cause. 
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properties).  Keeping these in mind, we can conceive a layered model of four levels, from 
lower level to higher level, applying to organisms like us  physical, chemical, biological 
and psychological. 
 
Generally, more complex higher-level states are emerged from less complex lower-level 
states configured (structured or organised; connected or interacting) in certain ways 
having certain dispositional and qualitative features.  More specifically, the relations 
between states in the different levels are as follow: 
 
• A psychological state is emerged from certain biological states in certain 
configurations having certain dispositional and qualitative features. 
• A biological state is emerged from certain chemical states in certain 
configurations having certain dispositional and qualitative features. 
• A chemical state is emerged from certain physical (atomic) states in certain 
configurations having dispositional and qualitative features. 
 
This implies that the higher-level states cannot be ontologically or epistemologically 
reduced to lower-level states because any reduction would fail to account for certain 
configurations, dispositions and qualities.  In other words, higher-level states cannot be 
inferred from lower-level states without invoking certain configurations, dispositions and 
qualities.  In this sense, the higher-level states emerge from the lower-level states by 




More complex higher-level states, whether as causes or effects, cannot take place in the 
absence of less complex lower-level states that constitute them at the same time.  In other 
words, higher-level states, whether as causes or effects, can only take place in the 
presence of simpler states that constitute them at the same time.  The case of one 
psychological state X causing another psychological state Y in a single person can be 
expressed in the following ways: 
 
• (Psychological-biological-chemical-physical) as a single state (State X) at time t 
causes (psychological-biological-chemical-physical) as a single state (State Y) at 
time t + ∆t. 
• (Psychological-biological-chemical-physical) causes at different levels constitute 
a single cause (State X) at t and the (psychological-biological-chemical-physical) 
effects at different levels constitute a single effect (State Y) at t + ∆t. 
• A single causal state (State X) can have different features at different levels 
(psychological-biological-chemical-physical) at the same time t.  And a single 
effect state (State Y) can have different features at different levels (psychological-
biological-chemical-physical) at the same time t + ∆t. 
 





Levels At t At t+∆t 
 
 
Person = biological parts in 




Organism = chemical parts 




Molecule = atomic parts in 




Atom = sub-atomic parts in 




Person A with 
Psychological State X 
↓ 
Constituted by or 
Emerged from 
↓ 
Biological State X 
↓ 
Constituted by or 
Emerged from 
↓ 
Chemical State X 
↓ 
Constituted by or 
Emerged from 
↓ 
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Person A with  
Psychological State Y 
↓ 
Constituted by or 
Emerged from 
↓ 
Biological State Y 
↓ 
Constituted by or 
Emerged from 
↓ 
Chemical State Y 
↓ 
Constituted by or 
Emerged from 
↓ 




In the above diagram, note that while the horizontal arrows signify a diachronic causal 
relation, the vertical arrows signify a synchronic non-causal (constitutive or emergent) 
relation.  State X (at all levels) of person A is conceived as a single cause at time t and 
State Y (at all levels) of person A is conceived as a single effect at time t+∆t.  Both 
upward and downward (vertical) causation are rejected in this model.  Only horizontal 
causation is admitted. 
 
This implies that higher-level states and their constituent lower-level states can exist at 
different levels in the same reality at the same time.  In other words, it is possible to view 
complex states and their constituent simpler states as single entities and not separate and 
distinct substances or properties.  I would now apply this model to address the problems 
of both synchronic and diachronic reflexive downward causation. 
 
This model would adjust synchronic reflexive downward causation as expressed by Kim 
above in the following way:  
 
At certain time, a whole, W, has emergent property M, where M is a feature of the 
following conditions: W has a complete decomposition into parts a1, an; each ai has 
property Pi; and relation R holds for sequence a1, an.  For some aj, Ws having M at t 
is a feature of aj having a certain configuration of Pj at t. 
 
The problem of circular causation is avoided by saying that in a whole W, emergent 
property M is a feature of (basal property) P configured in a certain way.  P does not 
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cause M (in the efficient sense) but it constitutes M.  Also, M does not cause P (in the 
efficient sense) because M is a feature of P configured in a certain way.  M and P are both 
conceived as a single event which can act as a cause or an effect of other events.  Also, M 
is not identical to or reducible to P because P alone does not account for the dispositional 
and qualitative features represented by M.  It is worth noting that this model does not 
violate the causal-power actuality principle.13 
 
This model would adjust diachronic reflexive downward causation as expressed by Kim 
above in the following way: 
 
At a certain time t, a whole, W, has emergent property M, where M is a feature of the 
following conditions: W has a complete decomposition into parts a1, an; each ai has 
property Pi; and relation R holds for the sequence a1, an.  For some aj, Ws having M 
at t, which is a feature of aj having a certain configuration of Pj at t, causes emergent 
property N at t + ∆t, which is a feature of aj having a certain configuration of Qj at t + 
∆t. 
 
For Kim, P displaces M as the cause of Q because M depends on and is determined by P.  
And because N depends on and is determined by Q, P would be the cause of N as well.  
Kim would conserve M as a functionally reducible property realised by P and holds that 
                                                
13 One may argue that even if the relationship between P and M is synchronic, M can still be fully 
dependent on and determined by P and is hence epiphenomenal.  Although I do not deny that possibility, I 
see P and M as a single cause because when we specify P as a cause, we are in effect specifying its 
synchronically related P (neural parts in certain configuration) and M (psychological properties = 
behavioural dispositions and phenomenal qualities = the ways neural parts in certain configurations are) as 
a single cause.  My view has the advantage of conserving Ms causal power and avoids epiphenomenalism 
without affirming downward causation. 
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M fully depends on P for its causal efficacy.  In other words, M is epiphenomenal.  This 
model avoids the problem of causal displacement by saying that in a whole W, emergent 
property M is a feature of (basal property) P configured in a certain way.  P does not 
cause M (in the efficient sense) but it constitutes M.  Also, M does not cause P (in the 
efficient sense) because M is a feature of P configured in a certain way.  M and P are both 
conceived as a single cause which causes N and Q as a single effect.  Also, M is not 
identical to or reducible to P because P alone does not account for the dispositional and 
qualitative features represented by M; and N is not identical to or reducible to Q for the 
same reason. 
 
I have mentioned the distinction between ontological and epistemological emergence 
briefly on a few occasions in the earlier parts of this paper.  To reiterate, ontological 
emergence refers to relations between higher-level emergent entities, properties, 
processes and events with their lower-level basal counterparts while epistemological 
emergence refer to relations between higher-level emergent concepts, theories, models 
and frameworks.  Usually, ontological emergence entail epistemological emergence.  The 
new higher-level novel entities, properties, processes and events, not deducible, 
predictable, explainable or expressible at the lower level, require higher-level concepts, 
theories, models and frameworks.  Some philosophers hold that it is not inconsistent to 
accept both ontological reduction and epistemological emergence.  Kim, in his article 
Making Sense of Emergence, exemplified this view.  My objection would be that (1) if 
ontological reduction were eliminative (that is, if emergent properties do not exist), then 
the emergent theories explain non-existent properties; and (2) if ontological reduction 
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were not eliminative (that is, emergent properties are conserved but rendered 
epiphenomenal), then emergent theories explain merely fictitious properties.  Some 
philosophers hold that it is not inconsistent to accept both ontological emergence and 
epistemological reduction.  Louise Anthony, responding to Kim on emergence in his 
article Making Room for the Mental, exemplifies this view.  My objection is that the 
reduced theory of an emergent property would be incomplete even if true.  That is, the 
reduced theory may be able to explain or express the basal objects and perhaps their 
configurations of the emergent properties truly but not the emergent properties 
(dispositions and qualities) themselves.  Hence, I believe that if one aspect of emergence 
is accepted, the other aspect has to be accepted as well.  As discussed, the acceptance of 
ontological emergence need not entail acceptance of configurational forces and 
downward causation; and epistemological emergence accounts for the dispositional and 
qualitative properties (ways objects are) when objects are configured in certain ways. 
 
In the context of mind-body problem, psychological states can be seen emergent 
relational properties (dispositions and qualities) of specifically configured biological 
states (nervous system).  Wholes here refer to persons who possess psychological states 
(emergent relational properties).  Parts here refer organisms which possess biological 
states (basal intrinsic properties).  Persons with psychological states (wholes with 
emergent relational properties) are instantiated when organisms with biological states 
(parts with certain basal intrinsic properties) in certain configurations are instantiated at 
the same time.  Psychological states are neither independent from biological states nor are 





In this chapter, I have argued first that if the layered model is qualified in certain ways, it 
can provide an approximate representation of reality to base the notion of emergence on.  
Second, I have shown that the notion of emergence can be refined and conserved without 
accepting the problematic notions of configurational forces and downward causation.  
Lastly, I have expressed this refined notion of emergence as a key conceptual component 
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Constitutive emergence is an ontological position based on the combination of two 
controversial concepts of constitution and emergence.  First, I briefly define and discuss 
the constitution as mereological relation without identity approach against the 
constitution as identity and constitution as co-location approaches and address the 
closely related notion of mereological supervenience.  Second, I briefly define and 
discuss the emergence as relational properties without downward causation approach 
versus the ontological emergence and epistemological emergence approaches and 
address the problem of configurational forces and downward causation.  Third, I explore 
the notion of the layered model of reality assumed by these approaches and its implied 
epistemological commitments to Ceteris Paribus Explanations.  Fourth, I argue that the 
constitution as mereological relation without identity approach is compatible with the 
emergence as relational properties without downward causation approach, and combine 
these approaches (which I shall call constitutive emergence) as a form of Non-reductive 
Physicalism (NRP), to provide a conceptual solution to the Mind-Body Problem (MBP) 
in its two aspects  the problem of mental causation (how the separate and distinct and 
separate minds and mental states have causal powers over brains and physical states if the 
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physical domain is causally closed?) and the problem of consciousness (how can the 
subjective character of minds and mental states be reducible to the objective character of 
brains and physical states?) 
 
Constitution as Mereological Relation without Identity 
 
Constitution can be conceived as a mereological relation between the whole and its parts.  
Some conceive constitution as identity  that is, the whole is identical to the sum of its 
parts.  The intuition behind constitution as identity is that the whole can be decomposed 
without residue into its component parts.  The whole has no additional components 
besides its constituents.  Others conceive constitution as co-location  that is, the whole 
and its parts are distinct but exist in the same place at the same time.  The intuition 
behind constitution as co-location is that the whole seems to have properties that its parts 
lacked and hence they cannot be identical.  My view of constitution  constitution as 
mereological relation without identity  rejects both constitution as identity and 
constitution as co-location.  I reject constitution as identity because it cannot account for 
the possible qualitative differences between the whole and its parts.  And I reject 
constitution as co-location because it is committed to the implausible view that the whole 
and its parts, which are made up of exactly the same components, are two distinct objects 
located in the same place at the same time.  My view of constitution is that the constituted 
whole is a summation of its constituting parts, their configuration and their relational 
properties.  Configuration can be defined in two ways.  In the static sense, it refers to the 
arrangement, organisation and structure of the parts that constitute the object.  In the 
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dynamic sense, it refers the processes of connections and interactions between the parts 
that constitute the object.  So when parts are arranged, organised, or structured in certain 
ways (in the static sense), or when parts connect, interact or enter into processes with 
each other in certain ways (in the dynamic sense); wholes constituted by these parts bear 
certain relational properties.  Properties are the ways objects are and they have both 
dispositional and qualitative features.  Objects as parts have their own intrinsic properties 
while objects as wholes have relational properties.  When we say that objects as parts 
constitute objects as wholes when configured in certain ways under certain 
circumstances, we can also say that intrinsic properties of parts constitute the relational 
properties of wholes when configured in certain ways under certain circumstances. 
 
Constitution and Mereological Supervenience (MS) 
 
One might ask how MS is conceived under the constitution as mereological relation 
without identity view.  On this account, MS asserts that the properties of the whole are 
determined by, fixed by, or dependent on and at the same time not possessed by, identical 
with, or reducible to the properties of its parts and their structural configuration.  In 
causal terms, MS asserts that the causal powers of the relational properties of the whole 
are determined by, fixed by, or dependent on and at the same time not possessed by, 
identical with, or reducible to the causal powers of intrinsic properties of its parts and 
their configuration.  When the intrinsic properties of its parts possess certain 
configuration, the whole possesses new and genuine relational properties.  What MS 
amounts to is this: MS asserts that certain constituting material parts in certain structural 
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configurations are necessary and sufficient conditions for the constituted whole and its 
relational properties, in such a way that when certain constituting material parts in certain 
structural configurations are instantiated, the constituted whole and its relational 
properties are instantiated.  In this way, MS does not imply a causal relation between the 
whole and its parts.  This is because if the intrinsic properties of the parts and their 
configuration and the relational properties of the whole are instantiated at the same 
time, then both the intrinsic properties of the parts and their configuration and the 
relational properties of the whole do not figure as the antecedent of (prior to) or the 
consequent of (posterior to) one another in a conditional (causal) relation.  So, the casual 
powers of the whole and its relational properties are conserved even when they are 
determined by or dependent on the intrinsic properties of its parts and their configuration.  
MS is understood as synchronic constitutive supervenience and not synchronic causal 
supervenience. 
 
Emergence as Relational Properties without Downward Causation 
 
Emergence can also be conceived within the mereological framework.  A system (whole) 
has certain relational properties when its component parts and their intrinsic properties 
are configured in certain ways under certain circumstances.  Ontologically, these 
relational properties are said to be emergent because they are neither identical to nor 
reducible to any of its component parts, the intrinsic properties of these parts, and their 
configuration.  Epistemologically, these relational properties are said to be emergent 
because they are neither deducible nor predictable from any knowledge of its component 
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parts, the intrinsic properties of these parts, and their configuration.  There is however, 
consensus among emergentists that the component parts, the intrinsic properties of these 
parts, and their configuration are the necessary conditions for the emergent relational 
properties.  My own view is that these emergent relational properties adds nothing to the 
component parts, they are simply the dispositions and qualities of the system (as a 
whole).  In other words, emergent relational properties are simply ways the system (as a 
whole) is.  Though the relational properties of any system are dependent on and 
determined by its component parts, their intrinsic properties and their configuration, they 
are not possessed by or caused by any of its component parts and their configurations.  In 
this way, the emergent relational properties are neither identical with nor reducible to the 
component parts, the intrinsic properties of these parts, and their configuration.  These 
non-identity and non-reducibility relation implies that any true description or explanation 
of the component parts, their intrinsic properties, and their configuration would not yield 
a complete description or explanation of the system (as a whole) and its relational 
properties.  In other words, any true description or explanation of parts and configuration 
of the system may not necessarily account for the dispositions and qualities of the system, 
and is hence incomplete. 
 
Emergence and Downward Causation 
 
It is useful to distinguish between ontological emergence and epistemological emergence, 
where the former is committed to downward causation while the latter is not.  For the 
former, relational properties are configurational forces of the system (whole) 
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ontologically and causally distinct from their component parts and configuration.  And 
they are able to causally influence their component parts and configuration.  In other 
words, relational properties of a system (whole) are capable of downward causation and 
they are not reducible its component parts or configuration.  For the latter, relational 
properties are not configurational forces of the system (whole) ontologically and causally 
distinct from their component parts and configuration, and hence are not capable of 
downward causation.  Here, relational properties as just patterns of behaviour and 
appearances of component parts in certain configurations.  New explanations and 
representations are required to account for these new patterns of behaviour and 
appearances, but these new patterns are in principle ontologically and causally reducible 
to its component parts and configuration. 
 
Constitutive emergence adopts the middle ground.  Relational properties are dispositions 
and qualities of systems when their component parts are configured in certain ways under 
certain circumstances.  In common with epistemological emergence, this view holds that 
relational properties are not configurational forces with downward causal influence over 
their component parts and configuration.  Relational properties, as dispositions and 
qualities, are in a sense pattern of behaviour and appearances possessed by systems under 
certain configurations and circumstances.  In common with ontological emergence, this 
view holds that relational properties, as dispositions and qualities, or as patterns of 
behaviour and appearances, are not ontologically or causally reducible to their component 
parts and configuration.  That is, though relational properties (= dispositions + qualities = 
patterns of behaviour and appearances = ways systems are) are not additional 
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configurational forces with downward causal influence over their component parts and 
configuration, they are the functions and features of systems that are not ontologically 
reducible to its component parts and configuration.  Causally speaking, systems 
consisting of component parts, configurations and relational properties count as a single 
causal object or event (whether as cause or effect), consistent with the notion of 
mereological supervenience as specified above.  Unless emergent explanation and 
representation refer to non-existent or fictitious objects and properties, the need for 
emergent explanation and representation implies ontological differences.  As discussed, 
the ontological differences here do not refer to additional configuration forces on top of 
component parts and configuration of systems, but rather dispositions and qualities of 
systems or ways systems are. 
 
Constitutive Emergence and the Layered Model of Reality 
 
Constitutive emergence is committed to the layered model of reality.  The layered model 
of reality can be seen as a form of layered mereological relation, where the lower level 
consists of component parts and configurations that constitute the wholes and relational 
properties at the next higher level; or where the higher level consists of wholes and 
relational properties that emerged from the next lower level.  From the bottom up view, 
component parts at the lower levels configured in certain ways constitute wholes and 
their relational properties at higher levels.  From the top down view, wholes and their 
relational properties at higher levels emerge from component parts at lower levels 
configured in certain ways.  Seen this way, constitution and emergence are the converse 
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of one another and they are compatible and consistent with one another.  On this view, 
the layered model of reality has the following assumptions: 
 
• The distinction between the less complex lower-level states and more complex 
higher-level states are not always clearly defined, they are just approximate 
representations of reality.  There may not be any conceivable highest-level or 
lowest-level states. 
• All higher-level states entail configurations of lower-level properties but not all 
configurations of lower-level states entail higher-level states.  States of varying 
complexity can be located at the same level (e.g. plants and animals). 
• It is possible for higher-level states to be complex configurations of much lower-
level states (e.g. non-biological beings with psychological properties). 
 
Keeping these assumptions in mind, we can conceive a layered model of four levels, from 
lower level to higher level  physical, chemical, biological and psychological, related in 
the following ways: 
 
• A psychological state is constituted by or emerged from certain biological states 
in certain configurations having certain dispositional and qualitative features. 
• A biological state is constituted by or emerged from certain chemical states in 
certain configurations having certain dispositional and qualitative features. 
• A chemical state is constituted by or emerged from certain physical (atomic) 
states in certain configurations having dispositional and qualitative features. 
 129
 
Generally, wholes are constituted by or emerged from parts in certain configurations 
having certain dispositional and qualitative features (relational properties).  It is important 
to bear in mind that wholes are neither identical nor reducible to the sum of its parts and 
their configurations because of the dispositional and qualitative features (relational 
properties).  Again, dispositions and qualities are ontologically distinct not because they 
add something new to the already existing parts and configurations, but because they are 
the ways wholes as systems are. 
 
Constitutive Emergence and Ceteris Paribus Explanations (CPEs) 
 
By committing to a layered model of reality (a metaphysical thesis), constitutive 
emergence is committed to CPEs (an epistemological thesis).  The term CPEs has its 
origin in the discussion of ceteris paribus clauses and Ceteris Paribus Laws (CPLs).  
Ceteris Paribus Laws (CPLs) are laws that contain ceteris paribus clauses.  The status of 
CPLs is highly contentious and I will not dwell on the details of this debate.  Instead, I 
will give a very brief summary of ceteris paribus clauses and CPLs, highlight the main 
problem with CPLs, and show the relevance of the less problematic notion of CPEs to 
Constitutive Emergence.  Ceteris paribus clauses (or the all things being equal clauses) 
can be read in two ways.  The first reading is provided that the lower level laws are not 
contradicted or provided that the lower level laws hold.  Also, in ideal conditions or 
provided that there are no interferences.  As the lower level objects constitute the higher 
level objects, the lower level laws that directly apply to lower level objects indirectly 
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apply to higher level objects.  It is just that the lower level laws do not account for the 
emergent properties (dispositions & qualities) of the higher level objects (= lower level 
objects configured in certain ways under certain circumstances).  The second reading is 
under special cases or in particular contexts.  This reading views ceteris paribus 
clauses as special cases of strict laws or strict laws applied to particular contexts.  In 
other words, the ceteris paribus clauses are just supplements to strict laws.  But these 
special cases and the particular contexts refer to the configurations, emergent properties 
and specific circumstances that cannot be accounted for by strict laws alone.  Whether 
one adopts the first or the second reading, strict laws are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for a complete explanation. 
 
CPLs are often criticised as vacuous, incomplete and indeterminate because there are too 
many unknown and uncertain variables (variables assumed by the ceteris paribus 
clauses).  As laws are supposed to be substantial, complete and determinate, laws can 
only be strictly applicable to the basic sciences (physics).  Hence, CPLs lacked the 
explanatory powers that only strict laws of the basic sciences can provide.  But even if we 
accept that laws have to be strict, they do not need to rule out CPEs of the special 
sciences (chemistry, biology, psychology).  In the context of the constitutive emergence 
view, CPEs account for the relational properties (dispositions & qualities) of the more 
fundamental objects (component parts) in certain configurations (structures and 
processes) under certain circumstances (environmental conditions), which are not 
accounted for by the strict laws.  Hence, CPEs does not lack explanatory powers.  For 
example, (ceteris paribus) psychological explanations account for the relational properties 
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(dispositions & qualities) of certain biological parts in certain configurations under 
certain circumstances; (ceteris Paribus) biological explanations account for the relational 
properties (dispositions & qualities) of certain chemical parts in certain configurations 
under certain circumstances; and (ceteris paribus) chemical explanations of the more 
fundamental atomic parts in certain configurations under certain circumstances. 
 
CPEs complement the Layered Model of Reality, where the higher level is constituted 
by and emerges from the lower level.  But it does not assume that there are separate and 
distinct objects at each level with independent causal powers that figures in upward and 
downward causal relations with each other.  Rather, the higher-level objects are just the 
lower level objects configured in certain ways that possess certain relational properties 
(dispositions & qualities) under certain circumstances.  A constituted object that 
possesses constituting objects and properties of many levels is a unified whole that is 
capable of being causally acted upon by other objects and causally acting on other 
objects.  CPEs do not necessarily entail causal pluralism, where an event can have 
independent causes from different levels.  As one object that possesses properties at many 
levels is a unified whole that is capable of acting on other objects, the causal power of a 
unified object does not imply causal pluralism.  Rather, the causal power of the unified 
object is the totality of the causal powers of its lower level through to the higher level 
properties.  In other words, the causal powers of the properties at each level constitute the 
causal power of the unified object. 
 
Constitutive Emergence and Non-Reductive Physicalism 
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According to Kim, NRP generally affirms the following theses: 
 
1. Mental properties are not reducible to physical properties.  (Irreducibility) 
2. Mental properties are causal properties.  (Mental Realism) 
3. Mental events cause physical events.  (Downward Causation) 
4. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t. (Causal 
Closure of the Physical Domain) 
 
And as noted by Kim, the central challenge faced by NRP is its inherent instability.  In 
affirming non-reductivism (theses 1 to 3), NRP attempts to save the appearances of minds 
and mental states but risks collapsing into dualism.  And in affirming physicalism (thesis 
4), NRP attempts to apply Ockhams razor to separate and distinct mental substances and 
properties but risks collapsing into reductive physicalism.  It is my aim to show that NRP, 
construed as constitutive emergence, is resilient against either collapse by affirming 
theses (1), (2), (4) and denying thesis (3). 
 
Lets look at the thesis (1) first.  In constitutive emergence, minds (or mental states) are 
constituted by or emerged from brains (or neural states), in such a way that when minds 
(or mental states) are instantiated, brains (or neural states) in certain configurations 
(structures and processes) are instantiated under certain circumstances (environmental 
conditions).  More generally, when wholes and their relational properties are instantiated, 
their component parts and configurations are instantiated at the same time.  In the context 
 133
of MBP, wholes refer to persons, relational properties refer to minds (mental states), 
component parts refer to brains (neurons), and configurations refer to the structures and 
processes of neural systems.  By holding that minds (or mental states) are simply the 
dispositions and qualities of brains (or neural states) configured in certain ways under 
certain circumstances, there is no need to conceive the mind (mental states) and the brain 
(neural states) as substances and properties of two separate and distinct realms, even 
when an ontological distinction can be drawn between them.  And when an ontological 
distinction between minds (mental states) and brains (neural states) is admitted, the 
reduction of minds (mental states) to brains (neural states) is rejected.  Lets explore this 
irreducibility a little further under the constitutive emergence view.  The relationship 
between constituting parts, their configurations and emergent properties are that 
constituting parts in certain figurations bear their emergent properties.  Just as we do not 
reduce emergent properties to their constituting parts or configurations, we do not reduce 
minds (mental states) to brains (neural states).  In the language of functionalism, brains 
(neural states) as constituting parts can be conceived as realisers or occupants, whereas 
minds (mental states) as properties can be conceived as functions or roles.  We can refer 
to a brain (realiser or occupant) as the summation of a set of neural states integrated and 
organised in certain ways under certain circumstances.  And we can refer to a mind 
(function or role) as a summation of a set of mental states integrated in certain ways 
under certain circumstances.  Again, when a brain or neural state (as constituting part, 
realiser or occupant) is instantiated under certain configurations and circumstances, a 
mind or mental state (as emergent property, function, or role) is instantiated.  Although 
(emergent properties, functions or roles) are dependent on, determined by, or possessed 
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by their (constituting parts, realisers or occupants) in certain configurations, (emergent 
properties, functions or roles) are not identical to, reducible to, or caused by their 
(constituting parts, realisers and occupants) in certain configurations.  Constituting parts 
in certain configurations bear (and are hence not identical to, reducible to, or causes of) 
emergent properties.  Emergent properties are at once the dispositions and qualities of 
constituting parts configured in certain ways.  Put simply, emergent properties are the 
ways constituting parts configured in certain ways are.  In the context of MBP, brains or 
neural states configured in certain ways bear (and are hence not identical to, reducible to, 
or causes of) minds or mental states.  Minds or mental states are at once the dispositions 
and qualities of brains and neural states configured in certain ways.  Put simply, minds or 
mental states are the ways brains or neural states configured in certain ways are.  The 
ontological distinction is now clear.  Minds (mental states) are not reducible to brains 
(neural states) not because they are substances and properties from separate and distinct 
realms, but because emergent properties (= dispositions and qualities = ways objects are) 
are distinct from their constituting objects and their configurations.  Hence, constitutive 
emergence affirms thesis (1). 
 
Lets look at theses (2) and (3) next.  The constitutive emergence view accepts thesis (2) 
and rejects thesis (3).  But is it inconsistent to accept thesis (2) and reject thesis (3) at the 
same time?  I believe that it is not.  A distinction can be made between the rejection of 
causal powers of minds and mental states (rejection of thesis 2) and the rejection of 
downward causation (rejection of thesis 3).  Constitutive emergence agrees with the 
latter but not the former.  But it remains to be shown how can the causal powers of the 
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mind and mental states be conserved if downward causation is rejected?  My answer is as 
follows: 
 
• All levels  whether psychological, biological, chemical, or atomic  of a single 
person enter into causal relationships as causes or effects as a single object or 
event.  As discussed, a psychological state is constituted by or emerged from 
certain neural states in certain configurations having certain dispositional and 
qualitative features.  When we specify a psychological state (relational property) 
as a cause or an effect, we also specify all its constituent biological, chemical, and 
atomic component parts as well as their complex configurations at every level, as 
a single cause or an effect.  Similar treatment applies to specifying a biological, 
chemical or atomic state as a cause or an effect as well.  Even atomic states have 
sub-atomic component parts and their configurations too.  In this way, the causal 
power of minds and mental states, as dispositions and qualities of brains and 
neural states, are conserved.  (Affirmation of thesis 2). 
• The constituent levels of a single person, whether psychological, biological, 
chemical, or atomic, are not related causally.  Causal relationships are horizontal 
and diachronic (where causal properties and effect properties occur at different 
times), not vertical and synchronic (where causal properties and effect properties 
occur at the same time).  The constitution and emergence relations between 
properties at different levels are vertical and synchronic and hence not causal.  So 
when a higher level psychological state (relational property) is constituted by or 
emerged from complex configurations of lower level biological, chemical, and 
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atomic states, it is not the case that lower level constituent states have causal 
powers over the emergent higher level psychological states (upward causation), or 
that the emergent higher level psychological states have causal power over the 
lower level constituent states (downward causation).  In this way, the downward 
causal power of minds and mental states on brains and neural states are rejected.  
(Rejection of thesis 3). 
 
By rejecting thesis (3), constitutive emergence is rejecting downward causation but not 
necessarily rejecting the causal powers of the mind and mental states, which is conserved 
by being irreducible dispositions and qualities (relational properties) of brains and neural 
states (specific biological states) in certain configurations.  Brains and neural states 
(specific biological states) are in turn dispositions and qualities (relational properties) of 
the more basic chemical and atomic states in certain configurations. 
 
Lastly, lets look at thesis (4).  NRP would not want to deny thesis (4) at all costs.  The 
consequence of denying thesis (4) would invite a myriad of non-physical forces acting on 
physical things and processes.  But what else can these distinct and irreducible causal 
powers of minds and mental states be if they are not some form non-physical forces?  
This is one way of expressing the tension between the non-reductive (theses 1 to 3) and 
the physicalist (thesis 4) theses held by NRP.  There are many solutions to ease the 
tension.  The first is to affirm theses (1) to (3) and deny thesis (4).  In doing so, NRP 
collapses into substance or property dualism.  The second is to affirm thesis (4) and deny 
theses (1) to (3).  In doing so, NRP collapses into reductive physicalism.  The third is to 
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accept thesis (1) and (4), and deny theses (2) and (3).  In this case, NRP collapses either 
into epiphenomenal dualism, where mental states and neural states are ontologically 
distinct but mental states have no causal powers; or into conceptual dualism, where 
mental states and physical states are conceptually distinct but ontologically identical.  All 
these solutions either solve the problem of consciousness or the problem of mental 
causation but not both.   Hence, they are not adequate solutions to the MBP. 
 
The fourth is to affirm theses (1), (2), (4) and deny thesis (3).  In this case, mental effects 
can have mental causes, even when physical effects cannot have mental causes.  In other 
words, the causal powers of the mental are restricted to the mental domain and they do 
not extend to the physical domain.  This comes closest to an adequate solution to MBP 
but the disconnectedness between the mental and physical remained.  Constitutive 
emergence is a version of fourth solution with the mental and the physical tied closer to 
one another.  It holds a broad view of the physical that accepts material parts, their 
configurations (structures and processes) as well as their dispositions and qualities 
(relational properties).  In the context of MBP, brains and neural states are the biological 
parts with complex configurations; minds and mental states are the dispositions and 
qualities (relational properties) of brains and neural states (biological parts with complex 
configurations).  This is analogous to biological dispositions and qualities of chemical 
parts with certain configurations; as well as chemical dispositions and qualities of atomic 
parts with certain configurations.  Hence, constitutive emergence affirms thesis (4), albeit 





Constitutive emergence is a form of NRP that approaches the two aspects of MBP in the 
following manner: 
 
• To the problem of consciousness, it saves the appearances of minds and mental 
states by conceiving them as the dispositions and qualities of brains and neural 
states configured in certain ways.  Under a broad conception of physicalism, 
brains and neural states are not to be conceived as merely lumps of neurons.  
Rather, they are complex configurations (structures and processes) of biological 
parts that have certain psychological dispositions and qualities (relational 
properties).  Unlike dualism, it saves the appearances of minds and mental states 
without the need to postulate separate and distinct mental substances and 
properties. 
• To the problem of mental causation, it applies Ockhams razor to separate and 
distinct mental substances and properties but conserves minds and mental states 
as dispositions and qualities of brains and neural states configured in certain 
ways.  In other words, minds and mental states are the ways configurations of 
brains and neural states are.  Under a broad conception of physicalism, brains and 
neural states (biological parts), their configurations (structure and processes) as 
well as minds and mental states (relational qualities) can be conceived physically.  
Unlike reductive physicalism, it does not apply Ockhams razor to minds and 
mental states altogether. 
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In this way, constitutive emergence has addressed both the problem of consciousness and 
the problem of mental causation simultaneously, hence qualifies as an adequate solution 
to MBP. 
 
At this point, my critics may say that I owe them an account of how are minds and mental 
states constituted by or emerged from brains and neural states.  The provision of such an 
account requires something akin to knowledge of the Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
(NCC)  an empirical but still contentious and inconclusive answer to the MBP.  In the 
first chapter of my thesis, I have indicated that my research objective is to derive an 
adequate conceptual answer to the question How to conceive the mind in relation to the 
body? by drawing from the relevant insights of various philosophers to that effect, and 
not to derive an empirical answer to the question How does the biological brain give rise 
to conscious states? by surveying the latest cognitive or neurological findings to shed 
light on this question.  If I have to make an empirical commitment, then I do share the 
sentiment of the British Emergentists in accepting that minds and mental states are 
possessed by brains and neural states configured in certain ways with natural piety, even 
when my view of emergence differs from them.  That said, constitutive emergence is not 
incompatible with an empirical account like NCC, it simply views neural correlates as 
the specific biological parts in certain configurations and consciousness as 
psychological dispositions and qualities.  And when these correlations are successfully 
uncovered, it does not mean that conscious states are identical with, reducible to, or 
caused by their neural correlates.  Rather, it means that the conscious states are 
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constituted by, emerged from, or possessed by their neural correlates.  It is worth 
emphasizing that neural correlates do not refer to simply neurons, but also to their 
configurations  structures and processes  of certain neural networks.  And with this, my 
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